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I. Introduction
Dissatisfied with the available protection under U.S. patent and copyright
law' and repeatedly failing to win passage of sui generis protection, 2 U.S.
product designers have increasingly looked to federal trademark and unfair
competition law3 in their attempts to prevent product knock-offs. They have
argued that consumers identify and distinguish the products of one producer
from those of others not only through the producers' marks and packaging, but
also through the appearance of the products themselves. Accordingly, if one
producer is permitted to copy the appearance of another producer's product,
this will lead to a likelihood of consumer confusion about the source of the
products or cause consumers falsely to assume an affiliation between the
producers. This potential consumer confusion is the very harm that the Lanham
Act, which provides a federal cause of action for trademark and trade dress
infringement, seeks to prevent.
1. For an explanation of product designers' dissatisfaction with U.S. patent and
copyright laws, see Margreth Barrett, Trade Dress Protection for Product Configurations and
the Federal Right to Copy, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 471, 472-75 (1998).
2. For discussion of the repeated attempts of U.S. product designers to win passage of
bills to provide sui generis protection of product design features, see Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 167-68 (1989); Jay Dratler Jr., Trademark Protection
for Industrial Designs, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 887, 904-08; J.H. Reichman, Design Protection in
Domestic and Foreign Copyright Law: From the Berne Revision of 1948 to the Copyright Act
of 1976, 1983 DuKE L.J. 1143, 1186-90.
3. See Lanham Act §§ 2,32,42,43(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052, 1114, 1124, 1125(a) (2000)
(outlining the various methods of protecting trademarks and other unregistered trade dress
features). While some product configurations and other features, or both, are registered as
marks on the Lanham Act principal register, most businesses avail themselves of the provisions
of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which provides a federal cause of action for infringement of
unregistered trade dress and other indications of origin. Id. § 1125(a).
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Businesses found reasonably fertile ground for such Lanham Act claims
during the 1980s and 1990s. To establish trademark or unfair competition
rights, the claimant must demonstrate that its alleged indication of origin is
distinctive (meaning that it indicates the origin of the claimant's product to
consumers) and nonfunctional, and that the defendant's use of a similar
indication of origin causes a likelihood of consumer confusion about the
source, sponsorship, or affiliation of the products.4 On the whole, courts were
receptive to arguments alleging that product feature trade dress could meet
these standards.' In 2000, however, product feature trade dress claimants
received a significant set-back from the Supreme Court's decision in Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc.6 In Wal-Mart, the Court expressed
skepticism that consumers typically rely on product features to indicate origin
7
and concern about the potential anticompetitive effects of readily recognizing
Lanham Act rights in unpatented aspects of the product itself.' Accordingly,
4. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205,209-211 (2000)
(discussing the Court's interpretation of the Lanham Act's requirements for protection of
unregistered "trade dress").
5. Federal trade dress claimants received a particular boost from the Supreme Court's
decision in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992), in which the Supreme
Court held that courts could protect inherently distinctive unregistered trade dress pursuant to
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act without the necessity of demonstrating secondary meaning.
Product feature trade dress claimants also stood to benefit considerably from the growing
acceptance of the premise that a likelihood of postsale consumer confusion would suffice to
establish infringement liability. See Barrett, supra note 1, at 504-07 (analyzing the possibility
of added protection for product feature trade dress claimants under a postsale consumer
confusion theory). Some of the circuit courts of appeals were more hospitable to product
feature trade dress claims than others. For a discussion of the positions of particular circuits, see
id. at 486-507.
In this context, some courts and commentators describe the alleged indications of origin as
"product features" and others describe them as "product configurations" or "product designs."
This Article uses the terms interchangeably, while acknowledging that courts may deem the term
"configuration" narrower than the term "feature" and that the term "product feature" may (and
often does) refer to a combination of features.
6. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
7. Id. at 213. Justice Scalia explained:
In the case of product design... we think consumer predisposition to equate the
feature with the source does not exist. Consumers are aware of the reality that,
almost invariably, even the most unusual of product designs-such as a cocktail
shaker shaped like a penguin-is intended not to identify the source, but to render
the product itself more useful or more appealing.
Id.
8. Id. at 213-14; see Stuart M. Riback, Product Design Trade Dress: Where Do We Go
from Here?, 90 TRADEMARK REP. 563, 564 (2000) (noting the Court's concern for free
competition and suggesting that this concern was a motivating factor in the Court's decision that
"product designs can never be inherently distinctive"). The Court also noted that the potential
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the Court held that product feature trade dress (as opposed to product
packaging trade dress) can never be deemed inherently distinctive. 9 Lanham
Act Section 43(a)'0 claimants who seek to assert rights in product features must
always demonstrate secondary meaning-in other words, establish that "in the
minds of the public, the primary significance of a [trade dress] is to identify the
source of the product rather than the product itself."'1 Because of the difficulty
of establishing secondary meaning in many unregistered trade dress cases, the
Court's decision significantly decreased the availability of the Lanham Act
Section 43 (a) cause of action.12
The Supreme Court dealt an even stronger blow the following year, in
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 3 which addressed the proper
standard for determining whether product feature trade dress is nonfunctional.
As a general matter, the nonfunctionality requirement's purpose is to ensure
that trade dress protection will not unduly interfere with free competition.'
4
The circuit courts of appeals had struggled considerably to define the proper
standard for functionality and failed to agree on a uniform standard. The
availability of design patent and copyright protection for product design features made it less
necessary to provide liberal unfair competition protection pursuant to the Lanham Act. Wal-
Mart, 529 U.S. at 214.
9. A trademark or other indication of origin is "inherently distinctive" if"[its] intrinsic
nature serves to identify a particular source." Id. at 211 (quoting Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco
Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992)). If an indication of origin is found inherently
distinctive, it can be predicated on a showing that the claimant used it in commerce. It is not
necessary for the claimant to demonstrate actual consumer reliance on the indication for
information about source.
10. Wal-Mart dealt with a Lanham Act Section 43(a) unregistered product feature trade
dress claim. The Court did not address whether the same rule regarding inherent distinctiveness
would apply in the case of product features that are registered as marks on the Lanham Act
principal register. However, the Court's reasoning likely applies equally to registered product
features.
11. Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 211 (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S.
844, 851 n.Il (1982)).
12. See Jeffrey M. Samuels & Linda B. Samuels, Trade Dress Undressed: Wal-Mart v.
Samara, 29 AIPLA Q.J. 43, 59-63 (2001) (analyzing Wal-Mart and the Court's secondary
meaning requirement to protect nonpatented trade dress); Riback, supra note 8, at 569-71
(observing the possible ramifications of the Wal-Mart holding that product designs cannot be
"inherently distinctive" and thus must have secondary meaning to gain trade dress protection).
13. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34 (2001).
14. As this Article demonstrates, this statement about the purpose of the nonfunctionality
requirement is intentionally general. Competing theories exist about what specific
anticompetitive effects the doctrine is meant to avoid and how it achieves these differing goals.
See infra Part V (examining the four policies related to market competition that traditionally
have served as the basis for functionality and evaluating TrafFix's implementation of these
policies, or lack thereof).
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majority of circuits determined that functionality should be measured by
evaluating the actual likely anticompetitive impact (or "practical effect") of
trade dress protection for product features under the circumstances of each case.
While these circuits varied in their formulations for measuring functionality,
they all placed considerable weight on the availability of alternative product
features that would provide competitors with an equally effective product. 5
In TrafFix, the Supreme Court rejected the practical effect approach as the
primary standard for functionality. It adopted instead a standard that focuses on
the role that the product feature plays in the product. If the feature is "essential
to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the
article," it is functional and unprotectable. 6 The Court held that measuring the
actual anticompetitive impact of trade dress protection should serve only as a
second hurdle for plaintiffs if the plaintiffs demonstrate that the product
features at issue are nonfunctional under the role of the feature standard.17
While most commentators agree that the TrafFix decision further reduces
a business's ability to assert trade dress protection for product features,
considerable disagreement exists among both scholars and the courts of appeals
over precisely how the Supreme Court intended its functionality standard to be
interpreted and applied.'" This Article attempts to construe the difficult TralFix
decision in light of earlier case law and to place it in the larger context of courts
of appeals and Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding trade dress protection
and the relationship between Lanham Act protection for product features and
patent law.
The first part of this Article reviews prior Supreme Court and courts of
appeals decisions and argues that the functionality standards that the courts
have stated can be roughly divided into three general categories: (1) a role of
the feature standard, which focuses on the role the feature plays within the
product;' 9 (2) a practical effect standard, which evaluates the actual likely
anticompetitive impact of product feature trade dress protection in a given case
15. See infra Part l1.B.2 (discussing the various levels of importance attached to the
availability of alternative designs in determining whether a product feature is functional).
16. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 32 (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159,
165 (1995)).
17. See id. ("Where the design is functional under the Inwood formulation there is no
need to proceed further to consider if there is competitive necessity for the feature.").
18. See infra Part IV.E (describing the different interpretations of the TrafFix
functionality standard, as applied by the federal courts).
19. See infra notes 69-73, 80, 83-94 and accompanying text (analyzing the functional
standard under the role of the feature categorization and describing the application of this
functionality interpretation).
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(taking into account the availability of alternative product features);20 and (3) an
important ingredient standard, which asks whether the product features at issue
are an important ingredient in the commercial success of the product.2'
Part II describes the Supreme Court's decision in TrafFix in greater
detail,22 and Part M discusses how the decision should be construed. Part III
concludes that TrafFix establishes a role of the feature standard that is
somewhat similar to the standard that the Third Circuit and the Restatement of
Torts Section 742 adopted as the primary standard for functionality. Under this
standard, a product configuration or feature will be functional if it plays a
material or important role in the use or purpose of the product, or affects the
product's cost or quality.23 TrafFix relegates the practical effect standard
(which the majority of the circuits had adopted) to serve as a back-up to prevent
trade dress protection of certain strictly aesthetic, arbitrary or incidental product
features, and it ignores the important ingredient standard altogether. Contrary
to the Federal Circuit's construction, Part IH argues that the TrafFix Court
intended courts applying its role of the feature standard to not consider the
.availability of alternative features.24
In an attempt to better understand the Supreme Court's purpose, Part IV
juxtaposes the TrajFix formulation, as construed, against four differing
theoretical underpinnings, or roles, that have been advanced for the
functionality doctrine. These theoretical underpinnings are: (1) the
Sears/Compco/Bonito Boats line of cases; 25 (2) the policy to avoid undercutting
utility patents;26 (3) the general policy favoring free competition; 27 and (4) the
constitutional doctrine of the "public bargain. 28 This Article concludes that
20. See infra Part l1.B.2 (discussing the practical effect form of the functionality
standard).
21. See infra Part ll.B.3 (describing the important ingredient standard and its application
in determining whether a product feature is functional).
22. See infra Part III (stating the factual background and the Court's findings in the
TrafFix decision).
23. See infra Part IV (discussing Tra/Fix's adoption of the role of the feature standard of
functionality and its connection to the policy basis of the functionality doctrine).
24. See infra Parts IV.A & E (evaluating TrafFix and stating that TrajFix does not
consider alternative designs to be relevant to the functionality standard).
25. See infra Part V.A (examining the Court's policy decisions in the
Sears/Compco/Bonito Boats line of cases and analyzing how TrafFix compares to the policies in
that line of cases).
26. See infra Part V.B (discussing whether TraJFtx reinforces or denies the policy to
"avoid undercutting utility patents").
27. See infra Part V.C (analyzing the "free competition" policy as an underlying theme of
the functionality standard and determining how TrafFix affects the policy).
28. See infra Part V.D (discussing the connection between the public bargain
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the TrafFix formulation is not fully consistent with any of the policies
that courts have cited as justifying or defining the functionality doctrine.
However, TrafFix can be characterized as taking the next step in defining
the scope of the policy set forth in the Sears/Compco/Bonito Boats line of
cases by incorporating that policy into its construction of the
functionality requirement under federal law, and thus limiting the reach
of Lanham Act protection. In contrast, the TrafFix formulation varies
from the Sears/Compco/Bonito Boats doctrine by applying a lower bar to
protection for purely ornamental product features.29
1H. Functionality Prior to TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing
Displays, Inc.
In construing and evaluating the Supreme Court's decision in
TrafFix, it is helpful to first consider the standard for evaluating product
feature functionality as it existed prior to that decision. Attempting to
provide this evaluation, this Part first examines prior Supreme Court
precedent and then examines a sampling of individual courts of appeals
decisions. What one finds in this undertaking is that no one settled
standard existed, either in the Supreme Court or in the circuits, but three
recurring (and somewhat conflicting) themes regularly surfaced in the
case law and commentaries.3 °
A. Functionality in the Supreme Court
Prior to TrafFix, the Supreme Court had not directed much attention
to the functionality doctrine. What the Court had said about the doctrine
varied somewhat from case to case (and even within the same case),
providing little guidance for lower courts. The following summaries
catalogue the Supreme Court's decisions prior to TrafFix.
constitutional doctrine and the functionality standard and arguing that TraJFix is inconsistent
with this policy).
29. See infra Part V.E (discussing TrafFix in relation to other precedent).
30. As noted earlier, when this Article refers to "a product feature," the term may
encompass a product's overall configuration or a combination of product features.
Traditionally, the term "trade dress" has mostly referred to the overall effect of a combination of
product or packaging elements. However, as will be discussed below at note 150, the Supreme
Court in TrafFix preferred to focus on a single element of the plaintiff's alleged trade dress.
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1. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.
In Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co. ,a" the plaintiff manufactured and
sold its breakfast cereal, Shredded Wheat, in the pillow-shaped form in which it
is still sold today.a2 The plaintiff held utility patents in the product and in the
process and machinery for making the product and a design patent in the pillow
shape." All of these patents had expired or been held invalid.34 In its suit, the
plaintiff argued that the defendant's practice of selling its competing product in
the same pillow-shaped form constituted unfair competition. 35 The Supreme
Court refused to enjoin the defendant from marketing its product in the pillow
form, noting, among other things:36 "The evidence is persuasive that this form
is functional-that the cost of the biscuit would be increased and its high
quality lessened if some other form were substituted for the pillow-shape.,
3 7
Assuming that the Court intended to state a general standard for functionality,
31. Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
32. Id. at 113.
33. Id. at 114-15.
34. The utility patents had expired. Id. at 117-18. The Court declared the design patent
invalid on the ground that the design had been in public use for more than two years prior to the
application for the patent. Id. at 119 n.4.
35. Id. at 116.
36. The Court provided two other justifications for its decision. First, the Court seemed
to suggest that the pillow form was generic:
A particular manufacturer can no more assert exclusive rights in a form in which
the public has become accustomed to see the article and which, in the minds of the
public, is primarily associated with the article rather than a particular producer, than
it can in the case of a name with similar connections in the public mind.
Id. at 120.
Second, the Court held that when a creator accepts patents for a creation he implicitly
agrees that the creation will be dedicated to the public when the patents expire. This reasoning
is sometimes called the public bargain doctrine. See infra Part V.D (discussing the public
bargain doctrine). The Kellogg Court explained:
The plaintiff has not the exclusive right to sell shredded wheat in the form of a
pillow-shaped biscuit--the form in which the article became known to the public.
That is the form in which shredded wheat was made under the basic patent. The
patented machines used were designed to produce only the pillow-shaped biscuits.
And a design patent was taken out to cover the pillow-shaped form. Hence, upon
expiration of the patents the form.., was dedicated to the public. As was said in
Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co... . "It is self-evident that on the expiration of a
patent the monopoly granted by it ceases to exist, and the right to make the thing
formerly covered by the patent becomes public property. It is upon this condition
that the patent is granted."
Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 119-20 (footnote omitted).
37. Id. at 122.
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this standard leaves many unanswered questions. It is unclear whether the
product feature must merely affect the cost or quality of the product or whether
it must decrease the cost or increase the quality. Must the product feature be
superior to the available alternatives in terms of quality or cost of
manufacture? The Court has never expressly clarified, although (as discussed
below) it later adopted a general standard for functionality that asks whether the
product feature "affects the cost or quality of the article."38 The Court cited
Kellogg as authority for that standard.39
2. Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.
In Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.,40 the plaintiff
marketed the 200 mg dose of its formerly patented drug in red capsules and the
400 mg dose in red-and-blue capsules. 41 The plaintiff alleged both unfair
competition and contributory trademark infringement against generic drug
companies who, in producing and distributing generic versions of the drug,
used the same color scheme for their capsules.42 The district court held for the
defendants on both claims, finding, among other things, that the red and red-
and-blue capsule colors were functional and thus freely available to copy.
43
The court of appeals reversed the finding of no contributory trademark
infringement, but did not address the unfair competition (trade dress) claims.
4
The Supreme Court reversed and instructed the court of appeals to review the
unfair competition claim.45
38. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n. 10 (1982).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 844.
41. Id. at 846-47.
42. Id. at 850.
43. Ives Labs., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., Inc., 488 F. Supp. 394,398-99 (C.D.N.Y. 1980).
The District Court reasoned that the colors:
were functional to patients as well as to doctors and hospitals: many elderly
patients associate color with therapeutic effect; some patients commingle
medications in a container and rely on color to differentiate one from another;
colors are of some, if limited, help in identifying drugs in emergency situations; and
use of the same color for brand name drugs and their generic equivalents helps
avoid confusion on the part of those responsible for dispensing drugs.
Inwood Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. at 853.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 858-59.
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While the Supreme Court did not need to comment on the functionality
issue, the Court nonetheless defined functionality in a footnote: "In general
terms, a product feature is functional if it is essential to the use or purpose of
the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article."46 For authority, the
Court cited two cases: Kellogg and Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.47 Sears
is not a functionality case.48 Rather, Sears involved a question of federal
preemption of state law.49 Sears emphasized Congress's intent that unpatented
product features remain in the public domain, available for competitors to
copy.5° While Sears addressed the use of state unfair competition laws to
shield unpatented product features from imitation, the Inwood Court's citation
suggests that it believed the decision to be relevant to federal trademark and
trade dress protection, as well.
The Inwood definition of functionality is open to conflicting
interpretations. The first half of the Inwood standard asks whether the product
feature is "essential to the use or purpose of the article. 5 Commentators have
suggested that this "essential" standard measures the feature against available
alternatives. 52 Under this interpretation, as long as there are alternative features
that will perform the same function just as well, the feature at issue is not
"essential" and may be protected as trade dress. On the other hand, one might
argue that a feature is "essential" if it plays a material or important role in the
product's function, regardless of whether alternative features are available that
could perform the role just as well.53 This definition (which would encompass
a larger number of product features) would be more nearly consistent with the
policy enunciated in Sears, which is that all unpatented product features should
be available for competitors to copy. The Court's citation to Sears as support
for the standard may suggest that it had the latter definition in mind.54
46. Id. at850n.10.
47. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
48. For a more detailed discussion of the Sears decision, see infra Part V.A.
49. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 376 U.S. at 225.
50. Id. at 231.
51. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (982).
52. See, e.g., Harold R. Weinberg, Trademark Law, Functional Design Features, and the
Trouble with TrafFix, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 18 (2001) (stating the Inwood functionality
definition and noting that under the first part a trade dress feature may be nonessential and thus
nonfunctional if viable alternatives exist).
53. For further discussion on this issue, see infra Part IV.C.
54. The TrafFix decision provides further evidence that the Court intended the latter
interpretation. See infra Part III (examining the Court's decision in TrafFix and considering
whether it is consistent with previous product trade dress protection cases).
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The second half of the Inwood definition asks if the feature "affects the
cost or quality of the article."55 Most product features might be said to "affect"
the product's cost or quality, for better or worse, regardless of the availability of
alternatives.5 6  Thus, the second half of the Inwood standard may be
characterized as a strict construction of the language in Kellogg, which removes
most important product features (perhaps all product features but the most
incidental or arbitrary ones) from trade dress protection, which is in keeping
with the policy enunciated in Sears.
In his concurring opinion in Inwood, Justice White provided another
definition of the functionality standard: "A functional characteristic is 'an
important ingredient in the commercial success of the product.' "5 7 This
standard seems to place the emphasis on the consumer's perception, rather than
on an analysis of the interrelationship of the feature with the product as a
whole. Moreover, this standard does not necessarily suggest that the feature at
issue must be superior to alternatives.
3. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co.
The final relevant Supreme Court decision to address the functionality
issue" was Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co.59 In Qualitex, the specific
55. Inwood Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. at 850 n. 10.
56. See In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1339 (C.C.P.A. 1982)
("[Elvery design 'affects' or 'contributes to' the utility of the article in which -it is embodied.");
Weinberg, supra note 52, at 18 ("[E]very design feature influences a product's cost or quality.").
57. Inwood, 456 U.S. at 863 (White, J., concurring) (quoting Ives Labs., Inc. v. Inwood
Labs., Inc., 601 F.2d 631, 643 (2d Cir. 1979)).
58. Some authorities have suggested that in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505
U.S. 763,775 (1992), the Supreme Court approved the Fifth Circuit's standard for functionality,
which at the time provided that "a design is legally functional, and thus unprotectable, if it is
one of a limited number of equally efficient options available to competitors and free
competition would be unduly hindered by according the design trademark protection." Two
Pesos, 505 U.S. at 775; see Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246,255-56 (5th
Cir. 1997) ("[T]he Supreme Court has placed its imprimatur on this standard."); William G.
Barber, Recent Developments in Trademark Law: Disrobing Trade Dress, Confounding
Dilution, and Condemning Cybersquatting, 10 TEx. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 245, 251 (2002)
(discussing Two Pesos); Weinberg, supra note 52, at 20 (noting Two Peso's seeming approval
of the Fifth Circuit's standard of functionality).
The question in Two Pesos was whether a Lanham Act Section 43(a) trade dress claimant
must demonstrate that inherently distinctive trade dress has secondary meaning, as a prerequisite
to recovery. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 764-65. The Court held that the plaintiff did not have to
show secondary meaning. Id. at 770-71. In discussing the question of whether it should be
necessary to demonstrate secondary meaning, the Court noted:
Suggestions that under the Fifth Circuit's law, the initial user of any shape or
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question before the Court was whether the green-gold color of a producer's dry
cleaning press pads, by itself, could be registered on the Lanham Act Principal
Register as a trademark. 60  The Court found no theoretical objection to
protection or registrability of color alone and found no "principled objection to
the use of color as a mark in the important 'functionality' doctrine of trademark
law":
61
The functionality doctrine prevents trademark law, which seeks to promote
competition by protecting a firm's reputation, from instead inhibiting
legitimate competition by allowing a producer to control a useful product
feature. It is the province of patent law, not trademark law, to encourage
invention by granting inventors a monopoly over new product designs or
functions for a limited time... after which competitors are free to use the
innovation. If a product's functional features could be used as trademarks,
however, a monopoly over such features could be obtained without regard
to whether they qualify as patents and could be extended forever (because
trademarks may be renewed in perpetuity) .... This Court consequently
has explained that, "[i]n general terms, a product feature is functional," and
cannot serve as a trademark, "if it is essential to the use or purpose of the
article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article," that is, if exclusive
use of the feature would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-
related disadvantage.62
In the course of its discussion, the Qualitex Court analyzed an example-
the shape of an "illumination-enhancing light bulb"-with no suggestion that
design would cut off competition from products of like design and shape are not
persuasive. Only nonfunctional, distinctive trade dress is protected under § 43(a).
The Fifth Circuit holds that a design is legally functional, and thus unprotectable, if
it is one of a limited number of equally efficient options available to competitors
and free competition would be unduly hindered by according the design trademark
protection. This serves to assure that competition will not be stifled by the
exhaustion of a limited number of trade dresses.
Id. at 774-75 (citation omitted). Given that the Two Pesos Court did not expressly adopt the
Fifth Circuit's definition and expressly stated that it had refused certiorari on the functionality
issue, it seems unlikely that the Court intended to make a precedential statement on the proper
standard for functionality. Id. at 767 n.6 (discussing the Court's reasons for granting certiorari).
59. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995).
60. Id. at 159.
61. Id. at 164.
62. Id. at 164-65 (citations omitted). The Court concluded:
Although sometimes color plays an important role (unrelated to source
identification) in making a product more desirable, sometimes it does not. And this
later fact-the fact that sometimes color is not essential to a product's use or
purpose and does not affect cost or quality-indicates that the doctrine of
"functionality" does not create an absolute bar to the use of color alone as a mark.
Id. at 165.
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the availability of alternative "illumination enhancing" shapes was relevant to a
finding of functionality.63 However, the Court's statement following the
Inwood standard ("that is, if exclusive use of the feature would put competitors
at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage"), 64 does suggest that the
availability of alternative features is relevant because trade dress protection of
product features is unlikely to specifically disadvantage competitors when equal
alternative features are available.65 Qualitex provides additional support for an
"alternatives-based" functionality standard when the Court rejects an argument
that permitting businesses to claim trademark rights in colors, by themselves,
will result in "color depletion," effectively leaving new businesses without
colors to use in marketing their products. In rejecting the argument, the Court
notes that "when a color serves as a mark, normally alternative colors will likely
be available" for others to use.66 When they are not, the "trademark doctrine of
'functionality' normally" will prevent "anticompetitive consequences., 67 The
Court concluded:
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition adds that, if a design's
"aesthetic value" lies in its ability to "confe[r] a significant benefit that
cannot practically be duplicated by the use of alternative designs," then the
design is "functional." The "ultimate test of aesthetic functionality," it
63. As the Court explained in Qualitex:
Functionality doctrine therefore would require, to take an imaginary example, that
even if customers have come to identify the special illumination-enhancing shape of
a new patented light bulb with a particular manufacturer, the manufacturer may not
use that shape as a trademark, for doing so, after the patent had expired, would
impede competition-not by protecting the reputation of the original bulb maker,
but by frustrating competitors' legitimate efforts to produce an equivalent
illumination-enhancing bulb.
Id.
64. Id. The Court has subsequently called this statement a competitive necessity standard.
See infra note 181 and accompanying text (discussing the interpretation of competitive necessity
prior to TrafFix).
65. See Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 1 Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 537-39 (5th Cir. 1998)
(discussing whether contested golf holes created a hindrance to competition); Vomado Air
Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1507 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that
functionality "has been defined.., in terms of competition" and if alternatives exist and the
contested design is not superior to the alternatives, then the design may receive protection).
66. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 168 (1995).
67. Id. at 168-69. The Court provides examples of cases in which courts found colors
functional, including: particular colors for pills, which allow patients to distinguish their
medications; black for outboard boat motors, which decreases the apparent size of the motor and
ensures "compatibility with many different boat colors;" and blue for fertilizer, to indicate the
"presence of nitrogen." Id. at 169-70.
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explains, "is whether the recornition of trademark rights would
significantly hinder competition. ,6
4. A Summary: The Key Themes in the Supreme Court
As the previous discussion demonstrates, three possible standards for
functionality exist in the Supreme Court's discussions of the functionality
doctrine. First, as Inwood illustrated, and perhaps Kellogg as well, the Court
has suggested that functionality turns on the relationship of the feature or
features at issue to the product, or on the role that the feature plays within the
product. Does the feature contribute to the use or purpose of the product? Is
the contribution significant? Does the feature affect the product's cost or
quality? Or, is the feature merely incidental or arbitrary? This standard is
highly consistent with that of the Restatement of Torts Section 742: "A feature
of goods is functional... if it affects their purpose, action or performance, or
the facility or economy of processing, handling, or using them; it is
nonfunctional if it does not have any of such effects."
69
In addition, the Restatement explains that a feature will be functional if it
"contributes" to a good's utility or durability, or "to the effectiveness or ease
with which" it serves its function or is "handled by users." 70 It may also be
functional if it contributes to the efficiency or economy of manufacturing,
handling, or marketing the good.7' Comment a adds that "[w]hen goods are
bought largely for their aesthetic value, their features may be functional because
they definitely contribute to that value and thus aid the performance of an
object for which the goods are intended. 7 2 The availability of alternatives does
68. Id. (citations omitted). The Court adds:
The upshot is that, where a color serves a significant nontrademark function-
whether to distinguish a heart pill from a digestive medicine or to satisfy the "noble
instinct for giving the right touch of beauty to common and necessary things"...
courts will examine whether its use as a mark would permit one competitor (or a
group) to interfere with legitimate (nontrademark-related) competition through
actual or potential exclusive use of an important product ingredient. That
examination should not discourage firms from creating esthetically pleasing mark
designs, for it is open to their competitors to do the same.
Id.
69. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 742 (1938). The ALl adopted the Restatement of Torts
standard the same year the Court decided Kellogg.
70. Id.
71. Id. at cmt. a.
72. Id. The Restatement adds that a feature will be nonfunctional if, "when omitted,
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not appear to be a consideration at any point in the Restatement of Torts'
functionality determination.
Although the role of the feature standard is a strict approach to
functionality that will significantly restrict trade dress protection for product
features, 3 it is consistent with the Sears case, which stresses the importance of
leaving unpatented product features in the public domain, within competitors'
reach. As long as a product feature plays a material or important function in the
product-that is, as long as the feature is not merely incidental or arbitrary-the
only available protection against copying will be a patent.
The second approach to functionality found in the Supreme Court's
decisions measures the actual, practical effect of protection on competition in
each case, which includes evaluating the availability of alternative features.
This approach might be inferred from Kellogg,74 might arguably be drawn from
the Court's use of the word "essential" in the Inwood standard,75 and can be
drawn from some of the Court's language in Qualitex. The underlying concern
is that trade dress protection not interfere with free competition. Arguably,
serious interference is unlikely as long as competitors have access to alternative
features that are equally effective. Thus, to be functional, the product features
must be superior to the available alternatives, or give some unique advantage.
This second approach is much more liberal than the role of the feature standard,
and advocates of stronger trade dress protection for product features favor this
approach. The American Law Institute gave this interpretation a boost with the
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition. The Restatement provides that a
design is functional if it:
[A] ffords benefits in the manufacturing, marketing, or use of the goods or
services with which the design is used, apart from any benefits attributable
nothing of substantial value in the goods is lost." Id. The flip side of this determination is
whether prohibiting others from imitating the features will "substantially hinder them in
competition." Id.
73. The strictness of the Restatement approach drew criticism from Judge Rich, then of
the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, in In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc.,
671 F.2d 1332, 1340 (C.C.P.A. 1982):
"[A]ffects" and "contributes to" are both so broad as to be meaningless, for every
design "affects" or "contributes to" the utility of the article in which it is embodied.
"Affects" is broad enough to include a design which reduces the utility or the
economy of manufacture.
Id. Judge Rich rejected the Restatement approach in fashioning the now-famous Morton-
Norwich test for functionality, which will be discussed infra at notes 95-109 and accompanying
text.
74. See supra Part II.A.I (discussing Kellogg).
75. See supra Part l.A.2 (discussing Inwood).
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to the design's significance as an indication of source, that are important to
effective competition by others and that are not practically available
through the use of alternative designs.76
Comment b emphasizes that: "A packaging or product feature is not functional
merely because the feature serves a utilitarian purpose. The recognition of
trademark rights is precluded only when the particular design affords benefits
that are not practically available through alternative designs. '77 For purposes of
brevity, this Article calls this approach the practical effect standard.
Justice White suggested the third approach to functionality in his
concurrence in Inwood (and again referenced it in Qualitex).78 This approach
asks whether the feature is an important ingredient in the commercial success of
the product. This Article calls this approach the important ingredient standard.
B. The Circuit Courts of Appeals
To date, the courts of appeals have been unable to agree on a uniform
standard for functionality. Indeed, each circuit has tended to adopt its own
76. RESTATEMENT (TmRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 (1995).
77. Id. at cmt. b. Comment b reiterates:
In general, a functional design is one that is costly to do without. Thus, the benefits
afforded by a particular design do not themselves determine whether that design is
functional; a design is functional only if those benefits cannot practically be
duplicated through the use of other designs. The availability of alternative designs
that satisfy the utilitarian requirements or that otherwise afford similar advantages
is therefore decisive in determining functionality.
Id.
Comment a explains the reasoning behind this standard:
The freedom to copy goods and services that have proven successful in the
marketplace is fundamental to the operation of a competitive economy. When the
public interest in permitting copying is outweighed by the need to insure adequate
incentive for investments in innovation, the freedom to copy may be temporarily
interrupted by a federal patent or copyright. In other instances the public interest in
copying may conflict with the interest in preventing confusion as to the source or
sponsorship of goods or services. The rule excluding functional designs from the
subject matter of trademark law is an attempt to identify situations in which the
public and private interest in avoiding confusion is outweighed by the
anticompetitive consequences of trademark protection. Thus, in determining
whether a particular design is "functional" and therefore ineligible for protection as
a trademark, the ultimate inquiry is whether a prohibition against copying will
significantly hinder competition by others.
Id. at cmt. a.
78. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995).
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uniquely worded standard.7 9 However, the three approaches to functionality
derived from the Supreme Court provide three general categories into which
most of the courts of appeals' decisions can be sorted.
The first category, designated the role of the feature standard, focuses on
the extent to which the product feature is related to the use or function of the
product. Only those product features that are arbitrary or incidental, or serve
only to identify the product's source may be deemed nonfunctional and subject
to trade dress protection under this standard . Courts applying this standard
have essentially assumed that if the product feature contributes significantly to
the function of the product, competition will be impaired if the feature becomes
the subject of exclusive trade dress rights.
The second category, designated the practical effect standard, allows
courts to deem product features that play a material or important role in the
product, other than identification of source, nonfunctional and protected. The
courts applying this standard assume that consumers' interest in avoiding
confusion and producers' interest in their chosen identifiers are at least co-equal
to competitors' interest in copying unpatented product features. Thus, a
product feature will only be deemed functional if it appears that protection will
"significantly" impair competition."' Courts applying this standard undertake to
determine whether, under the facts of each case, such "significant" impairment
will arise as the result of prohibiting competitors from copying the product
feature. One of the primary considerations they entertain in making this
determination is whether there are sufficient, equally good alternative product
features available to competitors.
The third category is designated the important ingredient standard. This
category holds that a product feature is functional if it is an important
ingredient in the commercial success of the product.12  Apparently, this
79. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Death of Ontology: A Teleological Approach to
Trademark Law, 84 IowA L. REv. 611, 686 (1999) (observing that the various circuit courts
have utilized different forms of the functionality standard); Weinberg, supra note 52, at 21
(noting the multitude of functionality standards that the federal courts employed); David S.
Welkowitz, Trade Dress and Patent-The Dilemma of Confusion, 30 RuTGERS L.J. 289,331-34
(1999) (examining the unpredictability of the circuit courts' application of the differing
functionality standards for trade dress protection cases).
80. See infra Part l.B. I (discussing trade dress protection cases that focus on the utility of
the feature or its essential use to the product as the primary basis for functionality).
81. See infra Part II.B.2 (examining the practical effect standard of functionality).
82. See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing the Ninth Circuit's adoption and application of the
important ingredient standard of functionality and comparing the other circuits' viewpoints of
this standard).
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standard relies on consumer perceptions and motivation in purchasing the
product at issue.
1. The Role of the Feature Standard
This general approach, which arises from a strict interpretation of Inwood,
and is consistent with the Restatement of Torts Section 742, arguably can be
found today in the Third Circuit, which has often proved conservative on the
subject of trade dress protection for product features.83  Because it is a strict
standard, the role of the feature approach furthers the view stated in the Sears
line of cases that unpatented product features should be routinely available for
competitors to copy.
For example, in Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Industries, Inc., 4 the Third
Circuit considered whether the unpatented exterior design of the "Wall Cube,"
an outdoor, wall-mounted lighting fixture, could be protected as trade dress.8"
The Third Circuit noted that "the concept of functionality has not been limited,
however, to features that are strictly utilitarian," and quoted from the definition
of functionality provided by Restatement of Torts Section 742.86 It then
concluded that:
[T]he inquiry should focus on the extent to which the design feature is
related to the utilitarian function of the product or feature. When the design
itself is not significantly related to the utilitarian function of the product,
but is merely arbitrary, then it is entitled to protection as a design trademark
if it has acquired the distinctiveness necessary to achieve a secondary
meaning .... Judge Gibbons summarized for this court the distinction
between functionality and non-functionality as follows: "Proof of
nonfunctionality generally requires a showing that the element of the
product serves no purpose other than identification.
8 7
83. See, e.g., Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co., 50 F.3d 189, 207-08, 216 (3d Cir. 1995)
(adopting an arguably more difficult standard for demonstrating infringement in product feature
trade dress cases than in other Lanham Act infringement cases); Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy
Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1442-47 (3d Cir. 1994) (adopting an unusually high
standard for demonstrating that product feature trade dress is inherently distinctive).
84. Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 1981).
85. Id. at 823.
86. Id. at 824.
87. Id. at 825-26 (quoting SK&F Co. v. Premo Pharm. Labs., Inc., 625 F.2d 1055, 1063
(3d Cir. 1980)); see Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy Mfg. Corp., 685 F.2d 78, 81 (3d Cir. 1982)
(stating that the standard quoted from SK&F is "congruent with" the Supreme Court's definition
of functionality in Inwood).
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Turning to the case before it, the Third Circuit found that the lighting fixture's
design was related to the product's utilitarian function, and thus was functional.
The court characterized the product's utilitarian function broadly, not only to
facilitate illumination, but also to provide "architectural compatibility with the
structure or building on which it is mounted."88 The plaintiff in Keene argued
that there were alternative designs for the lighting fixture and thus that the
fixture design should be deemed nonfunctional.8 9 The court appeared to reject
this argument. 90
The Third Circuit's standard for functionality, as described in Keene, is
similar in spirit to a strict interpretation of the Inwood standard, which asks
whether the product feature is "essential to the use or purpose of the article" or
"affects the cost or quality of the article."9' In each case, the courts deemed
product features that play a material or important role in the function of the
product functional and thus unprotectable under trade dress laws. Only
incidental or arbitrary features are likely to be protectable. 92 Indeed, the Third
88. Keene Corp., 653 F.2d at 826. The court stated:
The luminaire itself is essentially a utilitarian product, used to light exterior area.
However, because it is a wall-mounted luminaire, as distinguished from a free-
standing street lamp, part of its function includes its architectural compatibility with
the structure or building on which it is mounted. Thus its design configuration,
rather than serving merely as an arbitrary expression of aesthetics, is intricately
related to its function.
Id. Obviously, the strictness of this functionality standard will depend on how courts define the
utilitarian function of the products before them. Here, the court deemed that the design of the
light fixture was related to the function of the product only because the court defined the
product's function not merely to provide light but also to blend in with building architecture.
The Third Circuit has provided no guidance in defining the function of products for this
purpose.
89. Id. at 823-24.
90. The court noted:
Although Keene would have us adopt a standard inquiring whether the specific
design features of the product "were. competitively essential," we believe that is an
unnecessarily narrow view of functionality. This court has previously indicated
that merely because there are other shapes and designs "which defendant could use
and still produce a workable" product, the design used is not thereby nonfunctional.
Id. at 827. The court noted, however, that because "the policy predicate for the entire
functionality doctrine stems from the public interest in enhancing competition," a court may also
consider "whether prohibition of imitation by others will deprive the others of something which
will substantially hinder them in competition." Id. at 827 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§ 742, cmt. a (1938)).
91. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. [ves Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n. 10 (1982). For discussion
of such a "strict interpretation," see supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
92. The Third Circuit panels appear to differ somewhat on the role (if any) that
consideration of the availability of alternative product features plays in the overall analysis. See
infra note 94 and accompanying text (comparing two Third Circuit cases that allow the
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Circuit itself has described its standard as "congruent" with the Inwood
standard. 93 It is important to note, however, that some more recent Third
Circuit panels have suggested that the availability of alternative features may be
relevant to the functionality requirement, suggesting that the Third Circuit may
have been moving toward the practical effect standard adopted by the majority
of circuits. 94
2. The Practical Effect Standard
The practical effect standard is the most widely followed general approach
in the circuits: The Second, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Federal Circuits
availability of alternative product features to factor in the functionality decision).
93. Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy Mfg. Corp., 685 F.2d 78, 81 (3d Cir. 1982). For
another example of the Third Circuit approach, see Am. Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports,
Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1143-45 (3d Cir. 1986). In American Greetings, American Greetings
marketed "Care Bears"-pastel plush teddy bears with pictorial designs on their white stomachs,
known as "tummy graphics." For example, the "Funshine Bear" had a smiling sun on his
tummy, which conveyed the message, "Fun and Laughter;" the "Grumpy Bear" had a rain cloud
on his tummy, which conveyed the message: "It's OK to be out of sorts;" the "Bedtime Bear"
had a crescent moon and star, meant to convey the message "Sweet Dreams;" and so on. The
issue was whether the tummy graphics were functional, so that the defendant could market its
own teddy bears with tummy graphics. The Third Circuit found that the District Court had not
erred in finding the tummy graphics functional.
The Third Circuit noted that the proper standard is "'whether a particular feature of a
product or service is substantially related to its value as aproduct orservice, i.e., if the feature
is part of the "function" served, or whether the primary value of a particular feature is the
identification of the provider."' Id. at 1142 (quoting United States Golf Ass'n v. St. Andrews
Sys., Data-Max, 749 F.2d 1028, 1033 (3d Cir. 1984)). When "the feature is substantially related
to the product's value as a product, it cannot be protected 'because [its] usefulness in identifying
the source of the product or service is outweighed by the social interest in competition and
improvements, which are advanced by giving competitors free access to' that feature." Id.
Applying this principle to the case before it, the Court agreed that the tummy graphics
contributed to the "effectiveness and performance of Care Bears as plush toy teddy bears." Id.
The "tummy graphics" served "the purpose of communicating the particular personality of each
of the Care Bear characters," and conveyed "an emotional message through such personality."
Id. Moreover, the particular symbols that the plaintiffs had chosen for the tummy graphics were
also functional because they were "common figures and are typically associated with the
messages attributed to them by plaintiffs." Id.
For another good example of the Third Circuit's functionality standard, see Standard Terry
Mills, Inc. v. Shen Mfg. Co., 803.F.2d 778,781 (3d Cir. 1986).
94. See, e.g., Merch. & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods. Co., 963 F.2d 628,634 (3d
Cir. 1992) ("[T]his court, like the Morton-Norwich court, has held product configurations to be
functional when only a limited number of viable alternatives exist."); Ideal Toy Corp. v.
Plawner Toy Mfg. Corp., 685 F.2d 78, 81 n.4 (3d Cir. 1982) (recognizing the availability of
numerous alternatives and distinguishing Keene on the ground that it involved "aesthetic
functionality").
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have adopted it, though each varies somewhat in articulating and applying it.
Essentially, these Courts reject the notion that all product features that play a
significant role in the product (apart from source identification) must be
deemed functional and left in the public domain. Rather, they undertake to
evaluate the actual likely impact of protection on competition in each case and
find a product feature "functional" only if the potential impact of protection on
competition is "undue" or "significant" under the circumstances. They all
consider the availability of alternative product features in the course of this
evaluation, though they may consider other factors as well. Underlying this
approach is the assumption that the interests in preventing consumer confusion
about the source of goods and in protecting producers' investment in their
chosen indications of origin are essentially equal to the interest in protecting the
right of competitors to copy unpatented product features. Thus, competitors
may be prohibited from copying unpatented product features that serve to
indicate the origin of the product to consumers, unless the potential interference
with competition (through exclusion of copyists) appears to be significant.
One of the most influential decisions in this group is that of Judge Rich for
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (the forerunner of the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit) in In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc.95 In
Morton-Norwich, the appellant was seeking to register the shape, or
configuration, of the container it used to sell various household products,
alleging that the shape had acquired secondary meaning as a trademark.96 The
appellant already owned a design patent on the shape and a utility patent for the
container's spray top mechanism. 97 The question was whether the container
configuration was functional.
In evaluating that question, Judge Rich reviewed the underlying policy
and history of the functionality doctrine and argued that the label "functional"
has dual significance: It has a broad lay meaning (indicating that a thing
performs a function) and a narrower legal meaning (which leads to a
95. In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
96. Id. at 1334.
97. Id. at 1334. In his opinion, Judge Rich stressed the fact "that this is not a
'configuration of goods' case but a 'configuration of the container for the goods' case." Id. at
1336. However, he did not explain why this distinction was important. Subsequent cases
evaluating the functionality of product configurations have relied on Morton-Norwich without
noting or discussing the distinction. See, e.g., Valu Eng'g Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d
1268, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("To determine whether a particular product design is dejure
functional, we have applied the "Morton-Norwich factors."); see also Stormy Clime Ltd. v.
Progroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 977 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating Morton-Norwich's focus on hindering
competition and assessing the functionality of "similar features"); W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene,
778 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir. 1985) (relying on Morton-Norwich to determine functionality).
61 WASH. & LEE L. REV 79 (2004)
prohibition of trademark or unfair competition protection). 98 Thus, it is
important to distinguish "de facto functionality" and "de jure functionality."99
Only the latter should lead to a denial of trademark or unfair competition
protection. 00 Judge Rich then set out to determine when functional product
features are "de jure functional" and thus unprotectable.
Judge Rich rejected the notion that any design feature having utility
should be deemed de jure functional: "Under that reasoning, the design of a
particular article would be protectable as a trademark only where the design
was useless, that is, wholly unrelated to the function of the article."'' °
Moreover, in his view, the case precedent did not require that all unpatented
useful product features be available to competitors:
[I]t is clear that courts in the past have considered the public policy
involved in this area of the law as, not the right to slavishly copy articles
which are not protected by patent or copyright, but the need to copy those
articles, which is more properly termed the right to compete effectively.1
0 2
Thus, distinctive product features should only be available to competitors when
the "right to copy" outweighs the "right to protect one's method of trade
identification."' 3 De jure functionality should turn on a showing that the
design at issue is "superior in function (de facto) or economy of manufacture,"
and this superiority should itself be determined in light of the practical need of
competitors to copy. 1 4
Judge Rich provided several factors that courts should consider in making
that determination. First, an expired utility patent that discloses the utilitarian
advantage of the design should be relevant evidence that the design is de jure
functional.' 0 5 Second, significance attaches when the designer touts the
design's "utilitarian advantages through advertising."'' 0 6 Third, it may be
significant that a particular design "results from a comparatively simple or
98. Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1337.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1338. Judge Rich particularly rejected the standard set forth in Restatement of
Torts Section 742, noting that "[i]t appears to us that 'affects' and 'contributes to' are both so
broad as to be meaningless, for every design 'affects' or 'contributes to' the utility of the article
in which it is embodied." Id. at 1340.
102. Id. at 1339.
103. See id. at 1340 (asking which "weights do we set upon each side of the scale").
104. Id. at 1339.
105. Id. at 1340-41.
106. Id. at 1341.
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cheap method of manufacturing.' ' 0 7 Finally, "since the effect upon competition
is really the crux of the matter, it is ... significant that there are other
alternatives available."' 08 Judge Rich went on to analyze the household product
container before the court. Relying primarily on evidence of numerous equally
effective alternative container designs, the court found the applicant's design
nonfunctional.' 9
The Fifth Circuit has approached the question of functionality in a similar
fashion to Judge Rich and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. The Fifth
Circuit expressly found that trade dress may have some utility-that is, may
serve a useful purpose within the product other than source-identification-and
still be deemed legally "nonfunctional."" 0 The Fifth Circuit expressly rejected
arguments that product features are functional unless substitutes are possible
"without affecting use, purpose, cost, quality or commercial desirability."'II
The court found that such a rule was too broad because it "could conceivably
render any design functional because any change would undoubtedly somehow
affect cost, use, or commercial desirability."" '2 The Fifth Circuit noted that the
Supreme Court, in Qualitex, limited the definition of functionality set forth in
Inwood with the language: "[Tihat is, if exclusive use of the feature [or
combination of features] would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-
related disadvantage."' '3 According to the Fifth Circuit, this language made it
clear "that any effect must be great enough to significantly disadvantage
competitors in ways other than consumer preference for a particular source." 14
The Fifth Circuit found that the requisite disadvantage to competitors
would exist if a product feature or design were "one of a limited number of
equally efficient options available to competitors and free competition would be
unduly hindered by according the design trademark protection. ""' The court
107. Id.
108. Id. (internal quotes omitted).
109. Id. at 1343.
110. See Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417,429 (5th Cir. 1984) ("A design
that merely assists in a product or configurations' utility is not functional and may therefore be
protected."). Of course, like other circuits, the Fifth Circuit held that "[elven if a product design
incorporates certain functional features... 'a particular arbitrary combination of functional
features, the combination of which is not itself functional, properly enjoys protection."'
Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246, 256 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Taco
Cabana Int'l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1119 (5th Cir. 1991)).
111. Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 1, Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 539 (5th Cir. 1998).
112. Id.
113. Id. (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995)).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 537 (quoting Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417,429 (5th Cir.
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also considered whether the feature or combination of features was "superior or
optimal in terms of engineering, economy of manufacture, or accommodation
of utilitarian function or performance."" 6 The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that
"[t]his utilitarian theory of functionality, with its focus on competition, lowers
the threshold for trade dress protection. 'A design that merely assists in a
product or configuration's utility is not functional and may therefore be
protected. "'7
The Seventh Circuit has likewise stressed that a product feature can play
important roles other than identification of source within the product and still
be nonfunctional for purposes of trade dress protection." 8 Moreover, trade
dress protection may interfere with competition to some extent, as long as the
interference "is unlikely to have any significant anti-competitive effect. "' 19 As
Judge Posner explained: "[A] functional feature is one which competitors
would have to spend money not to copy but to design around." 20 According to
the Seventh Circuit, "[t]o achieve the status of 'functionality,' a design or
feature must be superior or optimal in terms of engineering, economy of
manufacture, or accommodation of utilitarian function or performance."
2'
1984)).
116. Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 429 (5th Cir. 1984).
117. Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246, 256 n. 18 (5th Cir. 1984)
(quoting Sicilia Di R. Biebow, 732 F.2d at 429). The Fifth Circuit has recently abandoned the
above standard because it fails to comply with the Supreme Court's decision in TrafFix. See
infra notes 238-42 and accompanying text (discussing the Fifth Circuit's application of
TrafFix).
118. See W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 341 (7th Cir. 1985) (recognizing that
protectable product features may play multiple roles in the product).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 339.
121. Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. Brikan Int'l, Inc., 814 F.2d 346, 350 (7th Cir. 1987) (quoting
Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 429 (5th Cir. 1984)). The Seventh Circuit
has focused expressly on the availability of alternative features in making its functionality
analysis. See W.T Rogers, 778 F.2d at 343 (discussing the availability of hexagonal and
rectangular designs of plastic stacking office trays).
With the possible exception of "aesthetic functionality" cases, the Ninth Circuit appears to
be in general agreement with the others in this group. See supra Part ll.B.3 (discussing the
important ingredient "aesthetic functionality" standard). The Ninth Circuit has specified the
following factors for consideration in determining whether a product feature is functional:
"(1) [W]hether the design yields a utilitarian advantage, (2) whether alternative designs are
available, (3) whether advertising touts the utilitarian advantages of the design, and (4) whether
the particular design results from a comparatively simple or inexpensive method of
manufacture .... No one factor is deemed dispositive; all should be weighed collectively."
Disc Golf Ass'n v. Champion Discs, Inc., 158 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 1998).
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Citing Qualitex as authority, the Second Circuit has conditioned
functionality on a finding that the right to copy unpatented product features
outweighs the right to protect one's method of trade identification in a given
case. 122 Fabrication Enterprises, Inc. v. Hygenic Corp.123 exemplifies the
Second Circuit's approach. 24 In Fabrication Enterprises, the district court
concluded that a manufacturer's use of colors to indicate the levels of resistance
of its resistance bands was functional because it was "important to the
usefulness of the item."3125 The Second Circuit held that this standard was
incorrect: It did not "take into account the fact that a color or color code, even
one that contributes to the function of the product, may be protected under the
Lanham Act unless the costs to competition of precluding competitors from
using the color are too high. " 26 The Second Circuit has construed the phrase
122. Fabrication Enters., Inc. v. Hygenic Corp., 64 F.3d 53, 61 n.9 (2d Cir. 1995).
123. Fabrication Enters., Inc. v. Hygenic Corp., 64 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 1995).
124. See id. at 60-61 (discussing the Qualitex standard and reversing the summary
judgment ruling).
125. Id. at 59.
126. Id. at 58. The court explained:
In Qualitex, the Supreme Court held that "where a color serves a significant
nontrademark function.., courts will examine whether its use as a mark would
permit one competitor (or a group) to interfere with legitimate (nontrademark-
related) competition through actual or potential exclusive use of an important
product ingredient .... Thus, a finding that a color serves a useful non source-
identifying function, which was the basis of the decision below, is in fact only the
starting point for analysis of whether protecting the color as an aspect of trade dress
would restrain competition unduly.
Id.
The court elaborated that underprotection of useful but distinctive product features would
injure competition by causing consumer confusion about the source of goods, while
overprotection of such features may injure competition by prohibiting access by competitors:
In order properly to account for these risks, a court must examine a number of
variables, including (I) the degree of functionality of the similar features of the
product, (2) the degree of similarity between the nonfunctional (ornamental)
features of the competing products, and (3) the feasibility of alternative designs that
would not impair the utility of the product. "These factors should be considered
along a continuum. On one end, unique arrangements of purely functional features
constitute a functional design. On the other end, distinctive and arbitrary
arrangements of predominantly ornamental features that do not hinder potential
competitors from entering the same market with differently dressed versions of the
product are nonfunctional and hence eligible for trade dress protection .... The
Supreme Court's emphasis in Qualitex on assessing how trade dress protection
might affect competition when applying the functionality doctrine makes this multi-
factored, industry-sensitive test even more vital, because only by examining all of
these factors can a court accurately assess how the extension of Lanham Act
protection to useful features may effect competition.
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"essential to the use or purpose of the article," as used in the Inwood standard,
to mean "dictated by the functions to be performed." '127 "[A] feature that
merely accommodates a useful function is not enough."' 2'
The Tenth Circuit has been perhaps the most liberal of all the Circuits in
this group. It "relie[s] heavily on the existence of a sufficient number of
alternatives, or substitutes, for the design features in question."' 29 As the Tenth
Circuit has explained:
Functionality... has been defined both by our circuit, and more recently by
the Supreme Court, in terms of competitive need. If competitors need to be
able to use a particular configuration in order to make an equally
competitive product, it is functional, but if they do not, it may be
nonfunctional. The availability of equally satisfactory alternatives for a
particular feature, and not its inherent usefulness is often the fulcrum on
which Lanham Act functionality analysis turns.13
6
3. The Important Ingredient Standard
The important ingredient standard is often associated with the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Pagliero v. Wallace China Co. 13' In Pagliero, Wallace
sought to prevent the defendant from "passing off' vitrified hotel china bearing
the same designs as Wallace china, alleging that the Wallace designs had
Id. at 59 (quoting Stormy Clime Ltd. v. Progroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 977 (2d Cir. 1987)).
127. Warner Bros. Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327, 331 (2d Cir. 1983) (emphasis
added).
128. Warner Bros., 724 F.2d at 33 1. The Second Circuit has also explained that a design
feature "affecting the cost or quality of an article" within the meaning of the Inwood standard is"one which permits the article to be manufactured at a lower cost." Id.
129. Vomado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1501 n.3 (10th
Cir. 1995).
130. Id. at 1507 (citation omitted). The Court added:
As some courts have explained the competitive need test, it conceivably could
allow one producer to permanently appropriate any distinctive patented invention
for exclusive trademark or trade dress use as soon as its patent expired and
sufficient alternatives became available to make the invention no longer one of a
few superior designs.
Id. Thus, "[c]onfigurations can simultaneously be patentably useful, novel, and non-obvious
and also nonfunctional, in trade dress parlance." Id. at 1506.
131. See Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952) ("If the
particular feature is an important ingredient in the commercial success of the product, the
interest in free competition permits its imitation in the absence of a patent or copyright.").
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become distinctive through acquisition of secondary meaning."' The Ninth
Circuit rejected the claim on the ground that the china designs were functional:
"Functional" in this sense might be said to connote other than a trade-mark
purpose. If the particular feature is an important ingredient in the
commercial success of the product, the interest in free competition permits
its imitation in the absence of a patent or copyright. On the other hand,
where the feature or, more aptly, design, is mere arbitrary embellishment, a
form of dress for the goods primarily adopted for purposes of identification
and individuality and, hence, unrelated to basic consumer demands in
connection with the product, imitation may be forbidden where the requisite
showing of secondary meaning is made. Under such circumstances, since
effective competition may be undertaken without imitation, the law grants
protection. 1
33
In the case before it, the court reasoned that one of the essential selling features
of hotel china is its design.' 34 Because the design satisfied purchasers' demand
for aesthetics, characterizing it as a mere arbitrary embellishment adopted
primarily for the purpose of identification and individuality was not
appropriate. Rather, the granting of relief to Wallace would render it immune
from the most direct and effective competition. The availability of alternative
china designs was irrelevant.
3
1
While this "important ingredient in the commercial success of the product"
standard bears similarities to the role of the feature standard discussed above,
36
it could differ in scope. For example, it might include product features that are
not related to the function of the product (however that function may be
defined) but nonetheless are related to consumer demand for the product.' 37 On
132. Id. at 340.
133. Id. at 343.
134. Id. at 343-44 ("The attractiveness and eye-appeal of the design sells the china.").
135. Id. at 344 (discussing multiple alternative designs). The court stated:
It seems clear that these designs are not merely indicia of source, so that one who
copies them can have no real purpose other than to trade on his competitor's
reputation. On the contrary, to imitate is to compete in this type of situation. Of
course, Tepco can also compete by developing designs even more aesthetically
satisfying, but the possibility that an alternative product might be developed has
never been considered a barrier to permitting imitation competition in other types
of cases. The law encourages competition not only in creativeness but in economy
of manufacture and distribution as well.
Id.
136. See supra notes 69-73, 83-94 and accompanying text (outlining the role of the feature
standard).
137. This might be the case for features that make the product more attractive to the eye,
even though the Court has not defined the function of the product to include aesthetic appeal.
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the other hand, it might also permit protection of product features that perform
a useful function within the product but nonetheless do not "constitute an
important ingredient in the commercial success" of the product. Clearly, the
important ingredient standard is stricter than the practical effect standard
because, as the Ninth Circuit noted, the possibility of alternative features is
irrelevant. 
31
A number of other circuits have expressly rejected the important
ingredient standard. 39 In Keene, the Third Circuit (which had adopted a
notably conservative approach to the functionality doctrine) 40 characterized the
important ingredient standard as giving too much competitor access to purely
aesthetic product features and permitting too much imitation.' 4' The Court
expressed concern that such a strict standard of functionality would undercut
producers' incentive to provide aesthetically pleasing product designs.' 42 A
138. Paglierov. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343-44 (9th Cir. 1952). The standard
set forth in Pagliero has often been referred to as "aesthetic functionality." However, the
standard clearly encompasses more than merely aesthetic product features.
139. See, e.g., Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1247 (6th Cir. 1991) ("Thus, the
precedent in this circuit suggest that aesthetic functionality will not preclude a finding of
nonfunctionality where the design also indicates source."); Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co.,
832 F.2d 513, 518-19 (10th Cir. 1987) (adopting a test which focuses on competition);
LeSportsac, Inc. v. Kmart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 77 (2d Cir. 1985) (rejecting the doctrine in part
because "[t]rade dress associated with a product that has accumulated goodwill ... will almost
always be an 'important ingredient' in the 'saleablity' of the product."); W.T. Rogers Co. v.
Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 343 (7th Cir. 1985) (discussing availability of alternative design features);
Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 428 (5th Cir. 1984) (retreating from the
Pagliero functionality standard); Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 825 (3d
Cir. 1981) (stating that the aesthetic functionality standard is not necessary to protect
competition).
140. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the Third Circuit's approach to the functionality
doctrine).
14 1. See Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 825 (3d Cir. 1981) ("[]t [the
'important ingredient' standard] provides a disincentive for development of imaginative and
attractive design.").
142. See id. at 825 (discussing difficulties with the important ingredient standard). The
Court noted:
The difficulty with accepting such a broad view of aesthetic functionality, which
relates the doctrine to the commercial desirability of the feature at issue without
consideration of its utilitarian function, is that it provides a disincentive for
development of imaginative and attractive design. The more appealing the design,
the less protection it would receive. As our ambience becomes more mechanized
and banal, it would be unfortunate were we to discourage use of a spark of
originality which could transform an ordinary product into one of grace. The
doctrine of aesthetic functionality need not be construed in such a manner for it to
fulfill its important public policy function of protecting free competition.
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number of other courts of appeals have expressly signed on to this criticism,
including the Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits.'43
Some circuits have also complained that the important ingredient standard
destroys a merchant's valuable trademark interest unnecessarily, without any
showing that competitors are unable to develop equally viable alternative
product features.'" Another criticism is that "[t]rade dress associated with a
product that has accumulated goodwill... will almost always be 'an important
ingredient' in the 'saleability' of the product."'145  Thus, the important
ingredient rule is likely to give competitors the benefit of the hard-earned good
will attached to the product feature.
46
The Third Circuit acknowledged that there was some support for the important ingredient
approach in comment a to the Restatement of Torts Section 742, which "defines aesthetic
functionality in terms of consumer acceptance." Id.
As noted earlier, the Third Circuit found it preferable to require that the product feature be
significantly related to the utilitarian function of the product. The Keene Court found the
attractive appearance of the product in that case to be a part of the product's function, so that the
aesthetic features were functional. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text (noting that
functionality is not limited solely to utilitarian features).
143. See Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I, Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 539 (5th Cir. 1998)
(criticizing the important ingredient standard); Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1246 (6th
Cir. 1991) ("Relating functionality to the commercial desirability of the feature regardless of its
utilitarian function discourages the development of appealing designs because such designs
would be entitled to less protection."); Wallace Int'l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art
Co., 916 F.2d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 1990) ("By allowing the copying of an exact design without any
evidence of market foreclosure, the Pagliero test discourages both originators and later
competitors developing pleasing designs."); Brunswick Corp. v. Spirit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513,
518-19 (1 0th Cir. 1987) (stating that the Court will not discourage originality).
144. See, e.g., Pebble Beach Co., 155 F.3d at 539 (stating that competitors must be
severely disadvantaged "in ways other than consumer preference for a particular source");
Wallace Int'l Silversmiths, 916 F.2d at 81 ("Where an ornamental feature is claimed as a
trademark and trademark protection would significantly hinder competition by limiting the
range of adequate alternative designs, the aesthetic functionality doctrine denies such
protection."). Indeed, in Illustration 6, Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition Section 17
specifies that a court must find foreclosure of alternatives before it can find the floral design of
china functional. RESTATEMENT (TInRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 cmt. c, illus. 6 (1995).
This is a clear repudiation of Pagliero.
145. LeSportsac, Inc. v. Kmart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 77 (1985); see also Esercizio, 944 F.2d
at 1247 (quoting LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 77).
146. See Pebble Beach Co., 155 F.3d at 538-39 (discussing the role of good will in the
important ingredient standard). The Fifth Circuit refused to accept arguments that the Qualitex
Court and Justice White (in his concurrence in Inwood) endorsed the important ingredient
standard:
Justice White's statement is merely an acknowledgment that a functional feature is
by definition important to the commercial success of a product because without the
functional feature a viable, competitive product could not be produced and because
competition would be injured if such a feature were protectable by trademark law.
The converse, however, is not true. To define functionality based upon commercial
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The Ninth Circuit itself has clearly backed away from the "important
ingredient in the commercial success of the product" standard, which it had
adopted in the Pagliero decision. 147  The Eighth Circuit, however, has
embraced the "important ingredient in the commercial success of the product"
standard and has continued to apply it.14' Nonetheless, some difference exists
among the Eighth Circuit panels about how strictly to apply the standard,
success would allow the second comer to trade on the first corner's goodwill, purely
because it would be easier to market his product and not because he could not
produce a viable, competitive product. Such a rule does not promote innovation,
nor does it promote competition, leaving no reason to narrow trademark protection.
The logical extension of this argument would practically obliterate trademark
protection for product design because a defendant could always argue that its
innovative product is a widget that provides a replica of the most popular or most
prestigious widget on the market, thus requiring that the defendant be allowed
without further analysis to copy the plaintiff's widget.
Id.
147. See Fabrica, Inc. v. El Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890, 895-96 (9th Cir. 1983) (rejecting
the proposition that "any feature of a product which contributes to the consumer appeal and
saleability of the product is, as a matter of law, a functional element of that product"); Vuitton et
Fils S.A. v.J. Young Enters., Inc., 644 F.2d 769,773 (9th Cir. 1981) (same). According to the
Ninth Circuit, "[n]either Pagliero nor the cases since decided in accordance with it compel such
a conclusion." Vuitton, 644 F.2d at 773.
The Court noted that the Pagliero standard asked not only whether the feature "is an
important ingredient in the commercial success of the product" but also whether the design "is a
mere arbitrary embellishment, a form of dress for the goods primarily adopted for purposes of
identification and individuality." Id. The Court went on to note that in Pagliero the four china
patterns were originally "intended primarily to beautify the china and not to identify the
manufacturer." Id. The patterns only came to identify their source after extensive advertising
and exposure to the public. By contrast, the product feature in the case at hand (dark brown,
vinyl-impregnated canvas, bearing an arrangement of the initials "LV" superimposed one upon
the other and surrounded by three floral symbols, which covered the plaintiff's luggage,
handbags and related items) incorporated the plaintiff's registered trademark and its founder's
initials and seemed clearly intended from the beginning to indicate the source of the product.
Id. at 774.
The Ninth Circuit also noted the difficulty of ascertaining what about a product feature
appeals to consumers. Id. For example, the canvas covering of plaintiff's luggage in the
Vuitton case, bearing an arrangement of the initials "LV" superimposed one upon the other and
surrounded by three floral symbols, might appeal to consumer's desire for aesthetically pleasing
luggage, but it might also appeal to their desire for the prestige of carrying a bag that plaintiff
made. Id. The functionality doctrine is meant to ensure that competitors can copy functional
features, but not the business good will of their competitors.
148. See, e.g., Insty*Bit, Inc. v. Poly-Tech Indus., Inc., 95 F.3d 663, 673 (8th Cir. 1996)
(adopting the important ingredient test for functionality); Stuart Hall Co., v. Ampad Corp., 51
F.3d 780, 790 (8th Cir. 1995) (discussing the distinction between trade dress functionality and
nonfunctionality); Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863, 873 (8th Cir. 1994)
(accepting the important ingredient standard in evaluating the functionality of the design feature
at issue); Prufrock Ltd., Inc. v. Lasater, 781 F.2d 129, 133 (8th Cir. 1986) (same); Truck Equip.
Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1217 (8th Cir. 1976) (same).
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particularly about whether a feature should always be deemed functional if it
performs a function other than source identification.
149
149. Compare Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863, 873 (8th Cir. 1994)
(stating that a feature must provide a function other than identification) with Prufrock Ltd. v.
Lasater, 781 F.2d 129, 133 (8th Cir. 1986) (employing the important ingredient standard). In
Prufrock, the Eighth Circuit recited the standard in Pagliero and explained:
In short, Prufrock's trade dress is nonfunctional if it is an arbitrary embellishment
primarily adopted for purposes of identification and individuality. But if the trade
dress is an important ingredient in the commercial success of the product, it is
clearly functional ....
We recognize that "[t]he line between functionality and nonfunctionality is not...
brightly drawn" and that some designs capable of protection under the Lanham Act
may also perform a utilitarian function .... However, "[t]he question in each case
is whether protection against imitation will hinder the competitor in competition."
Prufrock, 781 F.2d at 133 (quoting Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf, 536 F.2d 1210, 1218
(8th Cir. 1976)). The Prufrock Court went on to say:
If an element of the trade dress is unrelated to the consumer demand for the product
and serves merely to identify the source of the product, then a prohibition against
imitation will not hinder honest competition. For example, prohibiting a restaurant
from imitating another's distinctive and identifying logo will not hinder
competition .... However, prohibiting a restaurant from using an exposed kitchen
will hinder competition because watching the food preparation can be part of the
consumer appeal for the food service product.
Id.
Alternatively, in Aromatique, the Eighth Circuit stated the "important ingredient in the
commercial success of the product" standard but added that a "feature or design is functional
under our analysis... if it performs some function other than identifying the source of goods."
Aromatique, 28 F.3d at 873. The trade dress in that case was the packaging for the plaintiff's
potpourri, which it sold in pillow-shaped double cellophane bags that were closed at the top by
gathering the excess cellophane and tying it with cord in a square-knot bow. Id. The
prospective purchaser could both see and smell the potpourri, which provided both aesthetic and
olfactory appeal. Id. The court found that the packaging was central to the product's
commercial success because consumers want to see and smell the potpourri before they
purchase it. Id. at 874. Therefore, use of clear cellophane wrapped in a manner that allows the
fragrance to escape was "essential." Id. at 873. Moreover, double bagging the cellophane was
functional, not arbitrary, because it counteracted the corrosive properties of the potpourri,
increased the shelf-life of the potpourri, and protected the label, which was placed on the outer
wall of the inner bag. Id. at 874. The Court also rejected arguments that the size and shape of
the gathered cellophane "flower" formed when the bags were tied shut was an arbitrary
embellishment that could be protected: The Court reasoned that the "flowered top" was "clearly
the result of tying the cellophane closed," and the tying was itself a functional feature of the
packaging which allowed the aroma of the potpourri to escape and help sell the product. Id.
After finding the various individual features of the packaging functional, the Court held that the
packaging, viewed as a whole, was clearly functional. It was not:
[A]n arbitrary embellishment adopted for purposes of identification and
individuality. Instead, the combination of all of the features of the dress, except the
size and shape of the label (which may be separately protected trademarks that are
not at issue here), are important ingredients in the commercial success of
Aromatique's products.
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III. The TrafFix Decision
The product feature at issue in TrafFix was the "dual-spring design" the
plaintiff (MDI) incorporated into its outdoor road sign stands to keep the signs
upright in adverse wind conditions. 5 The plaintiff had obtained two utility
patents for a mechanism incorporating the design. The dual spring design was
visible near the base of the plaintiff's signs. The plaintiff claimed that buyers
and users of its sign stands had come to rely on it as an indication of source.
When the plaintiffs patents expired, the defendant (TrafFix) deliberately
copied the plaintiff's sign stands, complete with the dual-spring design near the
base and began to sell its sign stands in competition with the plaintiff's. 5 ' The
Id.
In his dissent, Senior Judge Gibson pointed out that the plaintiff had provided a number of
witnesses (both expert and lay) to give evidence on the question of alternatives. Id. at 883
(Gibson, J., dissenting). The district court had found "that there are numerous other ways to
package potpourri or decorative room fragrances, factoring in expense, visibility and aroma, and
that upholding the protection of the combination of the elements composing Aromatique's trade
dress would not hinder competition in the potpourri decorative fragrance industry." Id.
(Gibson, J., dissenting). However, the majority did not mention these findings. The dissent also
raised and discussed the Ninth Circuit cases that retreated from the Pagliero standard and
decisions from other circuits that criticize the "important ingredient in the commercial success
of the product" standard. Id. at 885 (Gibson, J., dissenting). However, the majority did not take
note of any of these opinions in its discussion.
150. See Mktg. Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 262,265 (E.D. Mich.
1997) (identifying the product feature at issue), rev'd, 532 U.S. 23 (2001). In TrafFix, the
plaintiff asserted trade dress rights in a combination of features:
(a) a relatively narrow base member;
(b) a pair of vertically arranged closely spaced coil springs attached to the base
member;
(c) a plurality of leg members attached to the base member and extending therefrom
at angles thereof;
(d) an upright member attached to the coil springs; and
(e) a sign attached to the upright member.
Id. However, the Supreme Court, like the district court below, treated the claim as essentially
one for protection for the dual-spring design alone. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg.
Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34 (2001) ("MDI in essence seeks protection for the dual-spring
design alone. The asserted trade dress consists simply of the dual-spring design, four legs, a
base, an upright, and a sign."). But see Mktg. Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 200 F.3d
929, 940 (6th Cir. 1999), rev 'd, 532 U.S. 23 (2001) ("The lower court committed legal error by
evaluating an individual component of the trade dress rather than its entirety."); Weinberg,
supra note 52, at 18 ("TrafFix ... casts a cloud over the principle that when a decision maker
decides whether a product's overall configuration is functional, that configuration should be
viewed in its entirety, and not as discrete individual design features.").
151. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 26.
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plaintiff brought suit for trade dress infringement under Lanham Act Section
43(a).1
5 2
The district court granted summary judgment to the defendant on the trade
dress claim, finding that the plaintiff had failed to establish secondary meaning
and that it "had not 'proffered sufficient evidence which would enable a
reasonable trier of fact to find that MDI's vertical dual-spring design is
nonfunctional."' '5 3 The Sixth Circuit reversed the trade dress ruling. 4 With
regard to functionality, the Sixth Circuit recited the language of the Inwood
standard.' It then noted that the district court had based its finding of
functionality on three main factors:
First, it found that the utility patent disclosed the dual-spring design as
functional, so that [plaintiff] is estopped from arguing that it is
nonfunctional in the trade dress context. Second, the district court found
that the dual-spring design had been promoted as functional, rather than as
aesthetic or a merely identifying feature. Finally, the lower court found that
recognizing [plaintiffs] trade dress claim would put competitors at a
disadvantage by affecting the cost and quality of the alternative designs
remaining for their use.
With regard to the first point, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged the existing
split in the circuit courts over whether trade dress protection can be extended to
product features disclosed in utility patents, 1 7 and acknowledged the concern
that trade dress protection might undermine "the public policy underlying
patent law of releasing protected designs after a period of time."' 5 8 It found,
however, that:
So long as it is possible to protect the appearance without protecting the
design, a per se rule is not necessary. Here that might be possible, as MDI
suggests, by not extending trade dress protection "to vertically arranged
coil springs with other leg members (U-shaped, parallel, etc.) and/or with
other uprights (twin poles, A-shaped, etc.) [that] may create an entirely
152. See id. at 25-26 (discussing the cause of action). The defendant also used a similar
mark for its product, prompting the plaintiff to allege trademark infringement. The defendant
raised antitrust counterclaims. The plaintiff prevailed on the trademark infringement and
antitrust issues in the lower courts. The Supreme Court did not address these issues. Id. at 26.
153. Id. at 26-27 (quoting TrafFix Devices, 971 F. Supp. at 276).
154. Marketing Displays, 200 F.3d at 929.
155. See id. at 939 (stating that "[a] product feature is legally functional 'if it is essential to
the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article"' (quoting
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different look altogether." It takes little imagination to conceive of a
hidden dual-spring mechanism or a tri or quad-spring mechanism that might
also avoid infringing [plaintiff's] trade dress. The best way to decide the
feasibility of such alternatives is to do a functional analysis of the trade
dress unencumbered by any presumptions other than the ordinary burden of
proof assumed by the plaintiff.15 9
The Sixth Circuit also took issue with the district court's finding that trade
dress protection would put MDI's competitors at a nonreputational
disadvantage:
Because the dual-spring design is one of a limited number of superior
designs, the lower court found that the design element is a functional one.
Presumably every limitation on what another competitor can do hinders
competition somewhat. The appropriate question is whether the particular
product configuration is a competitive necessity. If it affects the cost or the
quality or the objective (nonreputational) desirability of competitors'
products negatively enough, then the trade dress element may be deemed
legally functional. Having any effect on cost or quality is not enough.
Exclusive use of a feature must "put competitors at a significant non-
reputation-related disadvantage" before trade dress protection is denied on
functionality grounds.
MDI points to its numerous competitors and their equivalent products as
proof that MDI's trade dress is not a competitive necessity. The district
court stated that those competitors' designs are themselves patented and
therefore unavailable to TrafFix. That is beside the point. TrafFix does not
get to copy the trade dress of its competitor whose patent has expired just
because other design options are still under patent. TrafFix could come up
with its own design, or license one of the outstanding patents, or use the
dual-spring design in a way that does not infringe MDI's trade dress.'
6°
In its own opinion, the Supreme Court immediately set the tone for
reversing the Sixth Circuit's expansive view of trade dress protection for
product features and design:
[I]n Wal-Mart... we were careful to caution against misuse or over-
extension of trade dress. We noted that "product design almost invariably
serves purposes other than source identification."
159. Id. at 939-40. The Sixth Circuit found the fact that MDI had promoted the dual-
spring design's performance rather than its appearance to be irrelevant. It found that MDI had
not specifically promoted the appearance of the dual springs because its trade dress was not
confined to the dual springs. Rather, the entire look of its sign stand constituted the trade dress,
and MDI promoted the appearance of this trade dress through pictures in catalogs and in trade
shows. Id. at 940.
160. Id. (citations omitted).
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Trade dress protection must subsist with the recognition that in many
instances there is no prohibition against copying goods and products. In
general, unless an intellectual property right such as a patent or copyright
protects an item, it will be subject to copying. As the Court has explained,
copying is not always discouraged or disfavored by the laws which preserve
our competitive economy .... Allowing competitors to copy will have
salutary effects in many instances.1
61
The Supreme Court characterized the "principal question" in the case as
"the effect of an expired patent on a claim of trade dress infringement.'
6 2
While declining to adopt a per se rule prohibiting trade dress protection for
product features claimed in patents,'6 3 the Court concluded that a prior patent
has "vital significance" in resolving trade dress claims:
A utility patent is strong evidence that the features therein claimed are
functional. If trade dress protection is sought for those features the strong
evidence of functionality based on the previous patent adds great weight to
the statutory presumption that features are deemed functional until proved
otherwise by the party seeking trade dress protection. Where the expired
patent claimed the features in question, one who seeks to establish trade
dress protection must carry the heavy burden of showing that the feature is
not functional, for instance by showing that it is merely an ornamental,
incidental, or arbitrary aspect of the device. 
64
The Court went on to find that this rule clearly barred trade dress
protection for plaintiff MDI's dual spring design in this case. The expired
patents claimed the dual spring design. Because the design kept the sign
upright in heavy winds, it was the central advance the plaintiffs claimed, not
merely an ornamental, incidental or arbitrary aspect of the device.' 65 The Court
noted statements in the patent specifications and prosecution history explaining
the utilitarian advantages of a two-spring design over a single-spring design and
the cost advantages of two-spring designs over three-spring designs.'
66
161. Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23,29 (2001) (quoting Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 213 (2000)).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 35 (acknowledging arguments by TrafFix and some of its amici "that the Patent
Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, of its own force, prohibits the holder of an expired
utility patent from claiming trade dress protection"). The Court determined that it need not
resolve that constitutional question, however, noting that if, despite its strict rule regarding
functionality, "a case'arises in which trade dress becomes the practical equivalent of an expired
utility patent, that will be time enough to consider the matter." Id.
164. Id. at 29-30.
165. Id. at 30.
166. Id. at 31-32.
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Turning from the question of expired utility patents, the Supreme Court
noted that the Sixth Circuit had misinterpreted trade dress principles in other
respects and held that even if there had been no previous utility patent, MDI
could not have met its burden of establishing nonfunctionality. 167 The Court
stated:
Discussing trademarks, we have said "' [i]n general terms, a product feature
is functional,' and cannot serve as a trademark, 'if it is essential to the use
or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.'"
Expanding upon the meaning of this phrase, we have observed that a
functional feature is one the "exclusive use of [which] would put
competitors at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage .... ." The
Court of Appeals in the instant case seemed to interpret this language to
mean that a necessary test for functionality is "whether the particular
product configuration is a competitive necessity." This was incorrect as a
comprehensive definition. As explained in Qualitex, supra, and Inwood,
supra, a feature is also functional when it is essential to the use or purpose
of the device or when it affects the cost or quality of the device. The
Qualitex decision did not purport to displace this traditional rule. Instead,
it quoted the rule as Inwood had set it forth. It is proper to inquire into a
"significant non-reputation-related disadvantage" in cases of aesthetic
functionality, the question involved in Qualitex. Where the design is
functional under the Inwood formulation there is no need to proceed further
to consider if there is a competitive necessity for the feature. In Qualitex,
by contrast, aesthetic functionality was the central question, there having
been no indication that the green-gold color of the laundry press pad had
any bearing on the use or purpose of the product or its cost or quality.
68
The Supreme Court noted that in the present case, beyond serving the
purpose of informing consumers about the source of its sign stands (assuming
that it did so), the MDI dual-spring mechanism served the useful purpose of
resisting the force of the wind. That being the case, it was functional and could
not be protected as trade dress. The Court explained that it was unnecessary to
speculate about other configuration possibilities, as the court of appeals had:
167. Id. at 32.
168. Id. at 32-33 (citations omitted); see also supra note 58 and accompanying text
(discussing the Court's decision in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc. 505 U.S. 763 (1992)).
While acknowledging that it had permitted trade dress protection to inherently distinctive
"product features" in Two Pesos, the Court noted that it had "at the outset made the explicit
analytic assumption that the trade dress features in question... were not functional." TrafFix,
532 U.S. at 33. It is interesting to note that in Wal-Mart, the Court rejected the notion that the
trade dress at issue in Two Pesos constituted product features at all. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 215 (2000) (finding that the trade dress issue in Two Pesos
did not constitute product design).
CONSOLIDATING THE DIFFUSE PATHS
Here, the functionality of the spring design means that competitors need not
explore whether other spring juxtapositions might be used. The dual-spring
design is not an arbitrary flourish in the configuration of MDI's product; it
is the reason the device works. Other designs need not be attempted. 1
69
The Supreme Court concluded that the Lanham Act "does not exist to
reward manufacturers for their innovation in creating a particular device; that is
the purpose of the patent law and its period of exclusivity."'I70 Moreover, the
Lanham Act "does not protect trade dress in a functional design simply because
an investment has been made to encourage the public to associate a particular
functional feature with a single manufacture or seller."' 71 The Court reiterated
that "[w]hether a utility patent has expired or there has been no utility patent at
all, a product design which has a particular appearance may be functional
because it is 'essential to the use or purpose of the article' or 'affects the cost or
quality of the article.""
72
IV The Meaning of the Supreme Court's Decision in TrafFix
In Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court significantly curtailed use of the Lanham
Act to prevent product knockoffs. 173  The Court's opinion in TrafFix
substantially furthers that undertaking. '74 The TrafFix opinion establishes a
169. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23,33-34 (2001). The Court
added:
Because the dual-spring design is functional, it is unnecessary for competitors to
explore designs to hide the springs, say, by using a box or framework to cover
them, as suggested by the Court of Appeals. Ibid. The dual-spring design assures
the user the device will work. If buyers are assured the product serves its purpose
by seeing the operative mechanism that in itself serves an important market need. It
would be at cross-purposes to those objectives, and something of a paradox, were




172. Id. at 35 (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10
(1982)).
173. See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text (discussing the restriction of the
Lanham Act as applied to unpatented aspects of a product).
174. See Timothy M. Barber, Comment, High Court Takes Right Turn in TrafFix, but
Stops Short of the Finish Line: An Economic Critique of Trade Dress Protection for Product
Configuration, 7 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 259, 272 (2003) (noting that, given its
interpretation of the functionality doctrine, TrafFix curtailed product configuration trade dress
rights); Barber, supra note 58, at 252 ("[B]oth the Wal-Mart and TrafFix decisions represent a
marked departure from prior well-established trade dress analysis, significantly raising the bar
on plaintiffs seeking trade dress protection."); William T. Freyer, III, Trademark Product
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role of the feature standard of functionality, 7 ' similar to that found in the Third
Circuit and the Restatement of Torts Section 742, as the primary standard for
functionality. It rejects a practical effect standard 176 (various forms of which had
been adopted by the majority of the circuits and by the Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competition) as the primary standard for determining functionality. 177
TrafFix relegates the practical effect standard to serve as a back-up to prevent
trade dress protection of certain purely aesthetic, arbitrary, or incidental product
features. The TrafFix Court ignored the "important ingredient in the commercial
success" standard'7 1 suggested in Qualitex and in Justice White's concurring
opinion in Inwood, which the Eighth Circuit adopted. The following subsections
discuss these points in greater depth, along with some of their implications.
A. TrafFix Rejected a Practical Effect Standard as the Primary Standard for
Measuring Functionality
In Traf Fix, the Supreme Court directed courts to apply the Inwood standard
of functionality: whether the product feature or design is "essential to the use or
purpose of the article" or "affects the cost or quality of the article."' 79 The Court
further specified that if the product features at issue are nonfunctional under the
Appearance Features, United States and Foreign Protection Evolution: A Need for
Clarification and Harmonization, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 947, 971 (200 1) (recognizing that
fewer product appearances will be protectable under trademark law); Robert P. Renke, TrafFix
Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.: The Shrinking Scope of Product Configuration
Trade Dress, 91 TRADEMARK REP. 624, 626 (2001) ("The decision can be viewed as
significantly curtailing product configuration trade dress rights. Quite simply, if the trade dress
feature has utility or affects the cost or quality of the article, it is functional, and unprotectable
as trade dress."); Weinberg, supra note 52, at 60 (finding that TrafFix indicates the Court's
desire to narrow trademark protection for useful design features); 2001 Panel Discussion on
Current Issues in Trademark Law, I'll See Your Two Pesos and Raise You... Two Pesos, Wal-
Mar... and TrafFix: Where Is US. Supreme Court Jurisprudence Heading, and How Will It
Affect Trademark Practitioners?, I 1 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 509, 518,526,
543 (2001) [hereinafter 2001 Panel Discussion] (Prof. Hugh Hansen: "The Court indicated a
hostility to product design trade dress protection not seen before.") (Inna Fayenson, Esq.: "The
one message that is clear from the Wal-Mart and TrafFix decisions is that the Court is cutting
back on trade dress protection.") (Perry J. Saidman, Esq.: "The party is over for Section 43(a)
trade dress protection for product design.").
175. See supra Part lI.B.1 (discussing the role of the feature standard).
176. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the practical effects standard).
177. See Kerry S. Taylor, Note, TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Market Displays, Inc., 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 205, 219 (2002) (dividing functionality rules into "physical functionality"
and "economic functionality," and reading TraJFix as adopting the former).
178. See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the important ingredient standard).
179. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33-34 (2001).
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Inwood standard, courts must then apply the Qualitex standard: whether the
exclusive use of the product feature or design "would put competitors at a
significant nonreputation-related disadvantage."' 8 The Court described the
Qualitex standard as evaluating "competitive necessity" and equated it with the
Sixth and Tenth Circuits' practical effect standards. 8 ' This makes it clear that the
TrafFix Court did not intend for courts to focus on the specific impact of
protection on competition, or on the availability of alternatives, in assessing
functionality in the first instance under the Inwood standard. That would apply
the same standard twice. Rather, the Trafr'ix Court intended that the Inwood
standard would differ from the Qualitex standard.
But there are additional reasons why TrafFix cannot be read to adopt a
practical effect standard as its primary standard. In the course of its opinion, the
TraFix Court rejected much of the reasoning that led circuit courts to adopt a
practical effect standard. As discussed in Part lI.B, those courts assumed that the
interests in protecting trade dress proprietors' business goodwill and avoiding
consumer confusion were more or less co-equal to the interest in competitor
access to unpatented product features, so that a denial oftrade dress protection for
distinctive product features could only be justified when competitors lacked
available alternatives, and the inability to copy thus would "significantly" or
"unduly" impair competition.'82 In Wal-Mart and TrafFix, the Supreme Court
180. Id.
18 1. See id. at 32-33 (explaining the Qualitex standard for determining functionality). The
court stated:
Discussing trademarks, we have said: "'In general terms, a product feature is
functional,' and cannot serve as a trademark, 'if it is essential to the use or purpose
of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article."' Expanding upon the
meaning of this phrase, we have observed that a functional feature is one the
"exclusive use of [which] would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-
related disadvantage." The Court of Appeals in the instant case seemed to interpret
this language to mean that a necessary test for functionality is "whether the
particular product configuration is a competitive necessity." This was incorrect as a
comprehensive definition. As explained in Qualitex, supra, and Inwood, supra, a
feature is also functional when it is essential to the use or purpose of the device or
when it affects the cost or quality of the device. The Qualitex decision did not
purport to displace this traditional rule. Instead, it quoted the rule as Inwood had
set it forth. It is proper to inquire into a "significant non-reputation-related
disadvantage" in cases of aesthetic functionality, the question involved in Qualitex.
Where the design is functional under the Inwood formulation there is no need to
proceed further to consider if there is a competitive necessity for the feature.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
182. See, e.g., Fabrication Enters., Inc. v. Hygienic Corp., 64 F.3d 53, 58 (2d Cir. 1995)
("[A] color code, even one that contributes to the function of a product, may be protected under
the Lanham Act unless the costs to competition of precluding competitors from using the color
are too high."); In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1339-40 (C.C.P.A. 1982)
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seemed to question the notion that the interests in protecting business goodwill
and avoiding consumer confusion are in fact equal to the interest in competitor
access to unpatented product features. In Wal-Mart, the Court expressed
skepticism that consumers actually look to product features to indicate source,' 83
thus suggesting that copying product features will not pose the same risk of
consumer confusion that copying product packaging or labels will. At the same
time, in both Wal-Mart and TraJFix, the Court stressed the particular consumer
interest in permitting competitors to copy unpatented product features (as opposed
to labels and packaging trade dress).18 4 All in all, the Court appears to put a lower
value on trade dress protection for product features and a higher value on
competitor access, thus suggesting a broader standard of functionality than that
obtained under a practical effect standard (which attempts to balance these
interests).
A number of lower courts adopting a practical effect standard also justified
their choice of the functionality standard with the observation that stricter
standards may undercut producer incentives to create and promote innovative
product features. 5 However, the TrajFix Court stressed that trade dress law
"does not exist to reward manufacturers for their innovation," 86 thus suggesting
that the functionality doctrine should not be construed to promote or protect
producer incentives.
Lower courts adopting a practical effect standard also argued that a stricter
functionality test may unfairly or unnecessarily deprive trade dress owners of
valuable trademark investments and interests.'8 7 But TrafFix emphasized that the
Lanham Act does not protect designs "simply because an investment has been
made to encourage the public to associate a particular functional feature with a
single manufacturer or seller."'88
(balancing the "right to copy" and the "right to protect one's method of trade identification").
183. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 213 (2000)
("Consumers are aware of the reality that, almost invariably, even the most unusual of product
designs-such as a cocktail shaker shaped like a penguin-is intended not to identify the
source, but to render the product itself more useful or more appealing.").
184. See id. ("Consumers should not be deprived of the benefits of competition with regard
to the utilitarian and esthetic purposes that product design ordinarily serves."); TrafFix Devices,
Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 30 (2001) ("Allowing competitors to copy will have
salutary effects in many instances.").
185. See supra notes 142-43 (citing cases that observe that stricter standards may undercut
producer incentives to create and promote innovative product features).
186. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 34.
187. See supra notes 144-45 (citing lower court cases that cite "protecting investment"
concern as a justification for a practical effect standard).
188. Tra]Fix, 532 U.S. at 34-35; see also Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Group of Am.,
Inc., 269 F.3d 114, 120 n.4 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing TrafFix and rejecting the argument that
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In addition to rejecting these policy justifications for adopting the practical
effect approach, the TrajFix Court held that the existence of alternative designs, a
key factor in the various circuits' practical effect standards, was irrelevant to
application of the Inwood standard: "There is no need, furthermore, to engage, as
did the Court of Appeals, in speculation about other design possibilities, such as
using three or four springs which might serve the same purpose." 
18 9
Considering the availability of alternative features when applying Inwood
would also be inconsistent with the TralFix Court's emphasis on the evidentiary
value of utility patents. The TraJFix Court emphasized that disclosure of product
features in utility patent claims was of "vital significance" in resolving a trade
dress claim and would create a "strong evidentiary inference of functionality."'I9
Permitting the Section 43(a) trade dress claimant to satisfy his "heavy burden" of
rebutting that inference through evidence of alternative features would essentially
neutralize the effect of the utility patent and undercut the Court's purpose in
emphasizing utility patents. 19' TrafFix suggests that the inference may be
rebutted only by showing that the features play no material role in the invention's
operation. The Court specified that the inference might be rebutted by a showing
that the feature "is merely an ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary aspect of the
device."' 92 The plaintiff in TrafFix had provided evidence of alternatives in the
course of litigation. The Supreme Court ignored this evidence in its discussion,
merely stating that "MDI did not, and cannot, carry the burden of overcoming the
strong evidentiary inference of functionality based on the disclosure of the dual
spring design in the claims of the expired patents."' 
93
B. The Inwood Standard is a Role of the Feature Standard
The language of the Inwood standard, which is reminiscent of Restatement
of Torts Section 742 and is consistent with a role of the feature standard,' 94
focuses on the product feature itself and its relationship to the product as a whole.
resources spent researching bottle designs affect functionality).
189. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33.
190. Id. at 29-30.
191. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text (discussing the relevance of prior
patents).
192. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 30 (2001).
193. Id.
194. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 742, at 628-29 (1938). The Restatement provides that a
product feature is fuinctional "if it affects [the product's] purpose, action or performance, or the
facility or economy of processing, handling, or using [it]; it is non-functional if it does not have
any of such effects." Id.
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Moreover, the TraiFix Court's discussion and analysis emphasized the role of the
claimed feature in the product. For example, the Court explained that the product
feature at issue in Qualitex was not functional under the Inwood standard because
there was "no indication that the green-gold color of the laundry press pad had
any bearing on the use or purpose of the product or its cost or quality."' 95 The
Court suggested that a manufacturer might avoid a finding of functionality by
proving that the product features at issue "do not serve a purpose within the terms
of the utility patent.' 196 Moreover, the TrafFix Court's specific analysis of the
plaintiffs dual spring design entailed consideration of the relationship of the dual
spring design to the product as a whole, but entailed no analysis of the practical
effect of protection on competition, or the availability of alternative features. The
Court found the dual-spring design functional because it served "the important
purpose of keeping the sign upright even in heavy wind conditions" and because
it affected the cost of the device. 197 As evidence, it relied on the patent claims,
the patent specifications, and other statements in the patent prosecution history
concerning the purpose and effectiveness of the plaintiff's design.'9" Both of the
lower courts in the case had evaluated evidence concerning the availability of
alternative designs in the course of their analysis and had reached conflicting
conclusions about whether equally good alternatives existed. 99 The Supreme
Court did not discuss or evaluate that evidence in reaching its finding of
functionality. 00
195. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33.
196. Id. at 34. Of course, this "material" or "important" definition will still leave
significant room for varying outcomes, depending on how courts characterize the purpose of the
product and the product feature at issue. With regard to the latter issue, assume that a trade
dress claimant seeks to prevent a competitor from copying the unusually-configured cutting
blade of the claimant's can opener. If a court designates the blade as the "feature," it is
essential, because it plays an important role in the product-it opens the cans. It is not relevant
that other blade configurations might work just as well to open cans. On the other hand, if a
court designates the "configuration of the blade" as the "feature," a somewhat better case might
be made that the feature is incidental or arbitrary. For an example of a court taking the first
approach to characterizing the product feature, see generally Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz GMBH
v. Ritter GMBH, 289 F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2002).
197. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 31-32.
198. Id. at 30-32.
199. See supra notes 153-60 (discussing TrafFix's prior history).
200. See Barber, supra note 58, at 252 (discussing TrafFix's rejection of the "competitive
need" functionality standard). Barber states:
[Tra/Fix] concluded that the plaintiffs product design in this case was functional as
a matter of law, regardless of any effect on competition or the availability of
alternative designs, because it "provides a unique and useful mechanism to resist
the force of the wind."
Under the Supreme Court's analysis in TrafFix, therefore, it appears a distinctive
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C. The Meaning of "Essential" and Other Terms in the Inwood Standard
The Inwood standard asks whether the product feature is "essential" to the
product's use or purpose. This language contrasts with the language of
Restatement of Torts Section 742, which finds functionality when the feature
"affects [the good's] purpose, action or performance. 20 ' As discussed
earlier, 02 the term "essential" might be defined in a manner that supports
consideration of the availability of alternatives in evaluating functionality. A
number of commentators and lower courts apparently have done this to support
application of a practical effect standard under the Inwood language.2 3
However, as discussed above, the TrafFix Court did not intend to incorporate a
competitive necessity standard into the Inwood standard. The term "essential"
has another, equally well-known meaning, which the Supreme Court seems to
have had in mind for purposes of the Inwood standard.
Dictionaries define "essential" as: (1) "Affecting the essence of anything;
material; important;" and as (2) "Absolutely necessary, indispensably
requisite.''404The latter definition might support undertaking an evaluation of
product design can be denied trade dress protection even though the feature
provides no significant utilitarian advantage, and even though there are equally
effective alternative designs available to competitors.
ld.; see also Barber, supra note 174, at 270-71 (quoting TrafFix and stating that "once a court
finds that a design is essential to the use or purpose of the [product]... it affects the cost or
quality of the device, it need not consider alternative design possibilities"); Freyer, supra note
174, at 957, 963 ("Trafr'ix eliminated, to some extent, the test that permitted product feature
protection for alternative embodiments of a product."); Nancy Sya, Comment, Presumed
Functional Until Rebutted: The Increased Difficulty of Obtaining Trade Dress Protection with
an Expired Utility Patent, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 971, 989-91 (2003) (arguing that by
removing the examination of alternative grounds, the Court "revitalized the Inwood definition of
functionality" and "undermin[ed] existing policies and procedures for determining
functionality").
201. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 742 at 628 (1938) (emphasis added). According to the
Restatement, a feature of goods is functional "if it affects their purpose, action or performance,
or the facility or economy of processing, handling or using them."
202. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text (discussing the Inwood definition of
functionality).
203. See, e.g., Stormy Clime, Ltd. v. Progroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 977 (2d Cir. 1987)
(holding that the district court was required to assess the feasibility of alternative arrangements
of functional features in determining whether there was a trade dress infringement); Weinberg,
supra note 52, at 18-19 ("[A] choice design feature may not be essential and, consequently,
nonfunctional due to the existence of functionally-equivalent alternative design features.").
204. Tim COMPACT OxFORD ENGLSH DICnONARY 401-02 (2d ed. 1991). Webster's
provides two corresponding definitions of "essential": "something basic" or "something
necessary, indispensable, or unavoidable." WEaSrER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
1777 (1993).
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competitive necessity or the practical effect of protection, on the reasoning that
a product feature is only "essential" or "absolutely necessary" if there are no
equally effective alternative features available to competitors.205 However, the
first definition is far more consistent with the TrafFix Court's discussion: An
essential feature is one that plays a "material" or "important" role within the
product, or affects its essence. Under this definition, to determine whether a
feature is "essential" to the use or purpose of the product, one need only
consider what the product is, what its purpose is, and the role that the feature
plays in accomplishing the purpose. If the feature plays a "material" or
"important" role, it goes to the "essence" of the product and is "essential." The
feature must be evaluated in the context of the plaintiff's product, not in
relation to other products or product features. It is not necessary that the feature
perform its function better than other possible features. It only must contribute
to the accomplishment of the product's useful purpose and not be arbitrary or
incidental.
The TrafFix Court's analysis reflects this understanding. For example, the
Court found that "the springs [in the parties' sign stands] are necessary to the
operation of the device, ',206 and repeatedly referred to nonfunctional product
features as "arbitrary," or "incidental," which is the opposite of "material,"
"important," or "affecting the essence" of the product.
20 7
205. Some commentators have argued for this construction. See Weinberg, supra note 52,
at 18-19 (interpreting the Inwood standard's first test to provide "a choice design feature may
not be essential and, consequently, nonfunctional due to the existence of functionally-equivalent
alternative design features"). Moreover, it appears that the circuit courts applying practical
effect standards of functionality have assumed it. See, e.g., Adidas-Salomon A.G. v. Target
Corp., 2002 WL 31971831, at *6 (D. Or. 2002) (including the availability of alternative designs
as one of four factors for determining whether a feature of a product is functional).
206. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 30 (2001). Both of the
lower courts had discussed the availability of alternative designs in the course of their decisions.
The district court held that the designs of six competitors were either unequal to MDI's dual
spring design in terms of effectiveness, or unavailable to competitors because they were
patented. Mktg. Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 262, 275 (E.D. Mich.
1997), rev'd, 200 F.3d 929 (6th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 532 U.S. 23 (2001). The Sixth Circuit
rejected that finding. Mktg. Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 200 F.3d 929,940 (6th Cir.
1999), rev 'd, 532 U.S. 23 (2001). However, the Supreme Court's opinion did not undertake an
examination of the evidence concerning the effectiveness or availability of the existing
alternative designs, and specifically held that there was "no need ... to engage.., in
speculation about other design possibilities." Trafrix, 532 U.S. at 33.
207. The Court explained that a trade dress claimant could satisfy its burden of proving
nonfunctionality by showing that a claimed product feature is "merely an ornamental, incidental,
or arbitrary aspect of the device." TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 30. It explained that a manufacturer
might be able to protect "arbitrary, incidental, or ornamental aspects of features of a product
found in the patent claims." Id. at 34; see also I J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPErITION § 7:89, at 7-247 (4th ed. 2003) (explaining that the
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One might also argue that evidence of alternative features is relevant in
evaluating whether a product feature "affects the cost or quality" of the product
for purposes of the Inwood standard. For example, a dual-spring mechanism
on a traffic sign may be deemed to affect the cost of the sign because the cost of
incorporating it differs from the cost of incorporating a triple-spring or a single-
spring mechanism. 20 8 In this sense, one could argue that the possibility of
alternative spring constructions is relevant. However, it is often acknowledged
that most product features will affect the cost or quality of the product in one
way or another.209 Any evidence of alternatives such as that described above
will serve a much more limited purpose than evidence of alternatives in the
context of the practical effect standard of functionality. The evidence will go
only to the relation of the product feature at issue to the product in which it is
incorporated, not to the effect of protecting the feature on competitors.
D. The Role of the Feature Standard is Consistent with the TrafFix Court's
Policy Concerns
Construction of the Inwood standard to provide a role of the feature
standard is consistent with the apparent policy concerns of the Court. The
Court commenced its discussion with reference to the Bonito Boats decision,
which reaffirmed Sears and the policy stressed in the Sears/CompcolBonito
Boats line of cases.21° Sears, Compco, and Bonito Boats stressed that "the
Court probably meant to refer to nonfunctional features described in the patent specification,
rather than in the patent claims). In explaining why defendant TrafFix did not need to attempt
other designs, the Court explained that MDI's dual-spring device was "not an arbitrary flourish
in the configuration of [it's] product; it is the reason the device works." TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 34.
The Court noted that MDI had "pointed to nothing arbitrary about the components of its device
or the way they are assembled." Id.
The Third Circuit has used similar terminology in its own opinions. See, e.g., Keene Corp.
v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 823, 825-26 (3d Cir. 1981) ("When the design itself is not
significantly related to the utilitarian function of the product, but is merely arbitrary, then it is
entitled to protection as a design trademark."); SK & F Co. v. Premo Pharm. Labs., Inc., 625
F.2d 1055, 1064 (3d Cir. 1980) ("The adoption of that trade dress was arbitrary, having nothing
to do with the purpose on performance of the drug, or with its processing.").
208. See TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 32 ("The dual-spring design affects the cost of the device as
well; it was acknowledged that the device could use three springs but this would unnecessarily
increase the cost of the device." (quoting from patent prosecution history)).
209. See Renke, supra note 174, at 625 ("Every product feature ... affects the cost or
quality of the article.., even minor product changes can affect the cost or quality of the
article.").
210. The TrafFix Court explained:
In general, unless an intellectual property right such as a patent or copyright
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efficient operation of the patent system depends upon substantially free trade in
publicly known, unpatented design and utilitarian conceptions. '2 1  Thus,
unpatented product features should be left in the public domain for competitors
to copy at will. The Sears/Compco/Bonito Boats line of cases does not call for
case-by-case evaluation of competitors' practical need for a particular
unpatented product feature, or on a dearth of equally good alternative features.
It assumes that competition depends on the ready availability of all unpatented
product features, whether they be deemed "superior" to the alternatives or not.
The ability of other producers to intermingle and extrapolate from a wide range
of product features leads to more rapid technological advancement.212 The role
protects an item, it will be subject to copying. As the Court has explained, copying
is not always discouraged or disfavored by the laws which preserve our competitive
economy. Allowing competitors to copy will have salutary effects in many
instances.
TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 29 (citation omitted).
Though Sears, Compco, and Bonito Boats all considered the application of state law to
protect unpatented product features, the Supreme Court has indicated that its construction of the
Patent Act in that line of cases may have implications for construction of the Lanham Act, as
well as for state unfair competition laws. There is no apparent reason why the Court's findings
about the patent system's dependence on a backdrop of free competition should vary, depending
on whether protection of product features emanates from a state or federal source. See infra
notes 254-70 and accompanying text (discussing the Sears/CompcolBonito Boats line of cases).
211. SeeBonitoBoats, Inc. v. ThunderCraft Boats, Inc.,489 U.S. 141,156 (1989)(stating
that substantially free trade is at the heart of Sears and Compco).
212. See infra Part V.A (discussing the court's reasoning in the Sears/Compco/Bonito
Boats line of cases that patent laws provide an incentive to invent and maintain a competitive
marketplace). As the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has argued, even if a product
feature is not necessary to competition, providing Lanham Act protection may undercut the
effectiveness of the patent laws:
We find no support in the Patent Act itself or its application for the proposition that
the patent goals are limited to enhancing competition, at least in the direct sense.
To the contrary, patents operate by temporarily reducing competition. They create
monopolies to reward inventors who invent "things which are worth to the public
the embarrassment of an exclusive patent." Although competition ultimately may
be enhanced by the increased product supply that results from operation of the
patent law, the system's more obvious objective is to give the public the benefits of
technological progress.
In this respect, it is significant that the framers of the patent system did not require
an inventor to demonstrate an invention's superiority to existing products in order
to qualify for a patent. That they did not do so tells us that the patent system seeks
not only superior inventions but also a multiplicity of inventions. A variety of
choices is more likely to satisfy the desires of a greater number of consumers than
is a single set of products deemed "optimal" in some average sense by patent
examiners and/orjudges. And the ability to intermingle and extrapolate from many
inventors' solutions to the same problem is more likely to lead to further
technological advances than is a single, linear approach seeking to advance one
"superior" line of research and development. We conclude that patent law seeks the
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of the feature standard disqualifies a larger number of product features from
Lanham Act protection than a practical effect standard, and thus promotes the
policies set forth in the Sears/Compco/Bonito Boats line of cases.
It should also be noted that the role of the feature standard is less complex
and more predictable than the practical effect standard, which entails a fact-
intensive evaluation of the impact of protection on marketplace competition.
Under a role of the feature standard, courts must determine what the product is,
what its purpose is,213 and the nature and magnitude of the role that the product
feature plays in the product.2t 4 While these determinations may not be free
from uncertainty, 215 they are likely to present significantly less complexity and
unpredictability than the practical effect standard. Thus, the role of the feature
standard will lead to less litigation and impose fewer transaction costs and
fewer barriers to entry for competitors, thus promoting competition overall.
216
Accordingly, per TrafFix (and in line with the Sears line of cases), all
unpatented product features should be deemed functional and unprotectable
under the Lanham Act if they are "material" or "important" ("essential") to the
use or purpose of the article, or if they affect the cost or quality of the article.
Courts are only likely to deem them nonfunctional under this standard if they
are arbitrary or incidental in light of the product as a whole. Thus, it is
inappropriate to distinguish de facto and dejure functional features and provide
trade dress protection to the former, as does the Federal Circuit.2 17 If the
invention and the passing into the public domain of even what trade dress law
would consider nonfunctional inventions [under a competitive necessity or practical
effect approach].
Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1507-08 (1 0th Cir. 1995)
(internal citations omitted).
213. But see supra Part II.B. I (discussing the role of the feature standard).
214. Id. (discussing the role of the feature standard).
215. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (noting the leeway courts have in defining
the purpose of the product and the feature at issue).
216. This means of promoting competition is particularly beneficial if one assumes, as does
the Supreme Court, that the social gains from protecting product feature trade dress are low
(consumers generally don't rely on it to indicate source) and alternative means exist (through
protection of packaging and other marks) of avoiding consumer confusion. See generally
Barber, supra note 174, at 279-91.
217. See Renke, supra note 174, at 625 (stating that TrafFix was somewhat surprising
"given that since Qualitex few courts or commentators have equated functionality in the
trademark sense with mere usefulness"); Sya, supra note 200, at 990-91 ("TralFix has the
potential to eviscerate the distinction of defacto and dejure functionality, undermining existing
policies and procedures for determining functionality."); 2001 Panel Discussion, supra note
174, at 518 (supporting TrafFix's rejection of the Federal Circuit's idea of de jure and de facto
functionality); supra notes 98-109 and accompanying text (discussing de jure and de facto
functionality). But see Tie Tech, Inc. v. Kinedyne Corp., 296 F.3d 778, 785 (9th Cir. 2002)
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feature plays a material or important role in the product's function, apart from
source identification, it is functional and unprotectable under the Inwood
standard. There is no requirement that the feature be superior to the
alternatives. There should be no fact-intensive undertaking to measure
competitors' specific degree of need for a particular feature or to determine
how great an impact Lanham Act protection would have on competition.218
("De jure, or legal, functionality must be distinguished from de facto functionality, which still
may support trademark protection."); Valu Eng'g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 1274-
75 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("Our decisions distinguish defacto functional features, which may be
entitled to trademark protection, from dejure functional features, which are not.").
218. Of course, even if product features are nonfunctional in the primary (Inwood) sense,
courts may still deem them functional under the Qualitex functionality standard. This may be
true, for example, in the case of purely aesthetic product features, when the use or purpose of
the product is not defined to include aesthetic appeal. (In that case the aesthetic features may be
deemed "arbitrary" or "incidental.") The Qualitex standard, however, provides more leeway
than the Inwood standard, as construed. Courts may protect product features or designs on a
showing that protection will not "put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related
disadvantage" (that the particular product configuration is not a competitive necessity). TrafFix
Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001) (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson
Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995)). Presumably, if there are sufficient, equally good
alternative features available to competitors, there will be no competitive necessity.
The Qualitex standard is likely to be applied primarily in the case of purely aesthetic
features, as in the example given above. The existence and nature of "aesthetic functionality"
has been highly controversial and uncertain in the circuit courts of appeals. See, e.g., Clicks
Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1260 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing aesthetic
functionality). Some circuits have rejected the notion that courts should deem purely aesthetic
product features functional. See, e.g., Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 429
(5th Cir. 1984) (limiting functionality to "utilitarian" aspects of product or packaging: "[A]
design or feature must be superior or optimal in terms of engineering, economy of manufacture,
or accommodation of utilitarian function or performance"). Other circuits have related the
aesthetic role product features play to the overall function or purpose of the product. See, e.g.,
Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 825 (3d Cir. 1981) (requiring that a feature
have a significant relation to the utilitarian function of the product); see also RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 742, at 629 (1938) ("When goods are bought largely for their aesthetic value, their
features may be functional because they definitely contribute to that value and thus aid the
performance of an object for which the goods are intended."). For criticisms of the concept of
aesthetic functionality, see I McCARTHY, supra note 207, § 7:81.
TraJFix clearly recognizes that courts can deem purely aesthetic features functional. See
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 23 (expressly recognizing aesthetic
functionality). Presumably, aesthetic features may be functional under the Inwood standard, if
they are essential (material or important) to the use or purpose of the article or if they affect the
cost or quality of the article. This would be the case if part of the product's use or purpose is to
be aesthetically pleasing. Even if it is not, the aesthetic features would nonetheless be
functional under the Qualitex standard if their exclusive use "would put competitors at a
significant non-reputation-related disadvantage." Id. at 24 (quoting Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165).
Usually competitors have a wide range of options for purely decorative features. Thus the
Qualitex standard, when applicable, will permit aesthetic product features to be protected as
trade dress in many instances. This result contrasts with the Court's reasoning in Sears,
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This standard represents a significant cut-back on Lanham Act protection
for product features. 219 The Supreme Court suggested its general reasons for
Compco, and Bonito Boats, which provide the policy that unpatented product features must
remain in the public domain for competitors to copy. Sears and Compco both involved
ornamental product features that had been judged unworthy of a design patent. Sears and
Compco did not distinguish between "useful" and "ornamental" product features, finding both to
reside in the public domain if unpatented. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225,
231 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1964). For
further discussion of this issue, see infra notes 287-91 and accompanying text.
219. The extent to which TrafFix cuts back on trade dress protection may be affected by
how courts define "incidental" and "arbitrary" product features. If the term is given a liberal
construction, this might permit courts to protect some useful features. See, e.g., Best Lock
Corp. v. Schlage Lock Co., 413 F.2d 1195, 1199 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (describing the shape of a
wine bottle as incidental because its function (holding wine) could be served equally well by
other shapes); Keystone Consolidated Indus., Inc. v. Mid-States Distrib. Co., 235 F. Supp. 2d
901, 906 n.2 (C.D. III. 2002) (finding color on a wine top was incidental and thus
nonfunctional).
Presumably, courts can still protect individual product features that are functional as part of
a larger, composite nonfunctional product design or feature. See, e.g., Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v.
West Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246, 256 (5th Cir. 1997) (distinguishing "the isolated components of
the product from the trade dress, or 'total image,"' of the product). However, after Tra/Fix,
there is likely to be uncertainty about the extent of this exception. As noted supra, at note 150,
the Court in TrafFix basically ignored the plaintiff's claim that its dual spring design was merely
part of a total product design that consisted of several additional elements. However, the Court
did not expressly refute the long-standing rule that one considers and evaluates the functionality
of a claimed product design or other trade dress as a whole.
The Sixth Circuit addressed the issue of whether product features should be evaluated
individually or as a whole in Antioch Co. v. W. Trimming Corp., 2003 W.L. 22382569 (6th Cir.
Oct. 20,2003). In Antioch, the plaintiff claimed several features of its scrapbook album as trade
dress: (1) A dual strap-hinge design (which allowed the pages to lie flat when the album was
open, facilitated the turning of pages, and enabled easy insertion of additional pages); (2) a
spine cover (which concealed the dual strap-hinge); (3) laminated padded album covers; and
(4) ribbed page edges (which reinforced the pages, kept them separated, and held the staples
together). The district court, applying the Inwood test, found each of these individual
components functional and thus unprotected. Id. at *2. The plaintiff argued that the court
should have focused on the trade dress as a whole. Id. The Sixth Circuit found the plaintiff
"technically correct that an overall design combination may be deserving of trade dress
protection even if the individual elements are functional," id. at *6, but held that the principle
was inapplicable in the present case. The Sixth Circuit explained that "in order to receive trade
dress protection for the overall combination of functional features, those features must be
configured in an arbitrary, fanciful or distinctive way." Id. at *7. When "individual functional
components are combined in a nonarbitrary manner to perform an overall function, the producer
cannot claim that the overall trade dress is nonfunctional." Id.; see also Eppendorf-Netherler-
Hinz GMBH v. Ritter GMBH, 289 F.3d 351, 358 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that manufacturer
failed to carry burden of showing nonfunctionality for trade dress protection); Leatherman Tool
Group, Inc. v. Cooper Indus., 199 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that overall
appearance of tool was not protectable trade dress).
The Sixth Circuit also noted that, in the case before it, the dual strap-hinge was the "core
component" of the plaintiffs trade dress and construed Tra.fFix as teaching "that where an
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cutting back protection in Wal-Mart and TralFix: skepticism that consumers
generally rely on product features as indicators of source;220 concern that trade
dress protection for product features (in contrast to other indications of origin)
poses a particular threat to competition;221 and the recognition that producers
have alternative means of protecting innovative product designs through
copyright and design patents.222 The Court may also have wanted to tighten the
functionality doctrine in order to avoid troubling constitutional questions that
the defendant and some amici in TrafFix raised. These parties asked the Court
to confront the effect of the limiting language in the Constitution's Patents and
Copyrights Clause2 23 and determine the extent to which it curtails Congress's
ability to protect the subject matter of patents under its Commerce Clause
224powers. A ruling on this issue would have implications reaching far beyond
engineering design feature is the core component of the overall trade dress, a court may focus on
the functionality of that key feature." Antioch, 2003 W.L. 22382569 at *8. "[W]here one key
functional feature is the reason that the product works, whether it is a dual spring or a dual
strap-hinge, then the entire product configuration may be considered functional and not
deserving of trade dress protection." Id.
220. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 213 (2000) ("In the
case of product design, as in the case of color, we think consumer predisposition to equate the
feature with the source does not exist."); see generally A. Samuel Oddi, Product Simulation:
From Tort to Intellectual Property, 88 TRADEMARK REP. 101, 112-114 (1998).
221. See Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 213 ("The fact that product design almost invariably serves
purposes other than source identification not only renders inherent distinctiveness problematic;
it also renders application of an inherent distinctiveness principle more harmful to other
consumer interests.").
-222. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34-35 ("The Lanham Act
does not exist to reward manufacturers for their innovation in creating a particular device; that is
the purpose of the patent law and its period of exclusivity."); see id. at 214 ("The availability of
these other protections greatly reduces any harm to the producer that might ensure from our
conclusion that a product design cannot be protected under section 43(a) without a showing of
secondary meaning.").
223. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. ("The Congress shall have power... (8) To promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
224. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 33-37, TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc.,
532 U.S. 23 (2001) (No. 99-1571) (arguing that Congress may not, under the Patent clause,
indirectly create patent monopolies "by cloaking the subject of expired patents with perpetual
trademark protection"); Brief of Malla Pollack as Amicus in Support of Petitioner, TrafFix
Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001) (No. 99-1571) (arguing that the
"Intellectual Property Clause requires the bargain theory of Patent because it vests in the public
an inalienable property right not to be excluded from the public domain"); see also I.P. Lund
Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27,50 (1 st Cir. 1998) (questioning the constitutionality of
applying trademark dilution causes of action to protect product designs, reasoning that the
Patents and Copyrights Clause only authorizes Congress to provide patents for a "limited
duration" and that applying the Dilution Act to product features could have the effect of
granting patent-like protection for an unlimited period of time and could constitute use of the
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the question of trade dress protection for product features.22 The Court may
have preferred to avoid the question, at least for the time, by making the
Commerce Clause-based trade dress protection more difficult to obtain in those
cases posing the greatest constitutional concern.226
E. TrafFix in the Hands of Courts and Commentators
Notwithstanding the arguments above, in his influential treatise, Professor
McCarthy construes the Supreme Court's decision in TralFix not to exclude
evidence of alternatives from the initial functionality determination:
[T]he observations of the Supreme Court in TrafFix do not mean that the
availability of alternative designs cannot be a legitimate source of evidence
to determine in the first instance if a particular feature is in fact
"functional." Rather, the Court merely said that once a design is found to
Commerce Clause power to "trump" the limitations on congressional power set forth in the
Patents and Copyrights Clause); Hugh Latimer & Karyn K. Ablin, Stealth Patents: The
Unconstitutionality of Protecting Product Designs Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act,
90 TRADEMARK REP. 489, 507 (2000).
225. For example, to what extent does the language in the Patents and Copyrights Clause,
which prevents Congress from granting copyrights for databases lacking original expression,
prevent Congress from relying on its Commerce Clause powers to enact sui generis protection
for databases lacking original expression? See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499
U.S. 340, 362 (1991) (holding that the Patents and Copyrights Clause limits copyright
protection to original works of authorship and finding that the names, towns, and telephone
numbers of a telephone utility's subscribers were uncopyrightable for lack of originality); U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT ON LEGAL PROTECTION FOR DATABASE
PROTECTION 108 (1997) ("The Copyright Clause imposes certain restriction on Congress's
ability to enact copyright legislation."); Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Bounds of Database
Protection: The Role of Judicial Review in the Creation and Definition of Private Rights in
Information, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535, 545 (2000) (noting that the Court has repeatedly
stated that the Patents and Copyrights Clauses "prevent Congress from creating exclusive rights
in information that is already in the public domain"); William Patry, The Enumerated Powers
Doctrine and Intellectual Property: An Imminent Constitutional Collision, 67 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 359, 367 (1999) (discussing the conflict between the Copyright and Commerce Clauses);
Malla Pollack, The Right to Know?: Delimiting Database Protection at the Juncture of the
Commerce Clause, the Intellectual Property Clause, and the First Amendment, 17 CARIOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47, 61 (1999) (concluding that "a database protection act grounded on the
Commerce Clause can pass Constitutional scrutiny only if the act is carefully limited to
situations of market failure").
226. As the Court noted: "We need not resolve this [Constitutional] question. If, despite
the rule that functional features may not be the subject of trade dress protection, a case arises in
which trade dress becomes the practical equivalent of an expired utility patent, that will be time
enough to consider the matter." TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 35
(2001).
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be functional under Inwood, it cannot be given trade dress status merely
because there are alternative designs available.227
Presumably Professor McCarthy relied on the following language in the
TrafFix opinion:
There is no need, furthermore, to engage, as did the Court of Appeals, in
speculation about other design possibilities, such as using three or four
springs which might serve the same purpose .... Here, the functionality of
the spring design means that competitors need not explore whether other
spring juxtapositions might be used. The dual-spring design is not an
arbitrary flourish in the configuration of MDI's product; it is the reason the
device works. Other designs need not be attempted.
Because the dual-spring design is functional, it is unnecessary for
competitors to explore designs to hide the springs, say, by using a box or
framework to cover them, as suggested by the Court of Appeals .... The
dual-spring design assures the user the device will work. If buyers are
assured the product serves its purpose by seeing the operative mechanism
that in itself serves an important market need. It would be at cross-
purposes to those objectives, and something of a paradox, were we to
require the manufacturer to conceal the very item the user seeks.
22 8
It seems unlikely that the Court meant merely to say that once a design is found
functional, it cannot be given trade dress status merely because there are
alternative designs available. The Sixth Circuit did not hold that when product
features are functional trade dress defendants must nonetheless select
alternative features for their own products. It found the dual-spring design
nonfunctional, in part because of the availability of alternative designs. 229 Nor
has any other court of appeals held that courts can protect functional designs as
227. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 207, § 7:75, at 7-181 to 7-182; see also Siegrun D. Kane,
Wal-Mart and TrafFix Road Signs on the Trade Dress Highway: Trade Dress and Product
Development, 670 PLI/PAT 493, 505-508 (2001) (agreeing with Professor McCarthy's
interpretation); Weinberg, supra note 52, at 62 (analyzing Tra/Fix). Weinberg wrote:
[W]hat TrafFix may teach us is that when a senior producer has the burden of
proving that a choice design feature is nonfunctional, a junior producer's strong
evidence of functionality cannot be overcome by a senior's weak evidence of
alternative design features. So read, TrafFix merely recognizes that multiple forms
of evidence bear on functionality, and does not rule out considering evidence of
alternative design features.
Weinberg, supra note 52, at 62.
228. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33-34 (2001) (citations
omitted).
229. Mktg. Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 200 F.3d 929,939-40 (6th Cir. 1999),
rev'd, 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
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trade dress, under any circumstances. Why should the Supreme Court devote
two paragraphs to clearing up a misconception that did not exist?
Moreover, even if the quoted language is read to say that there is no need
to consider the existence of alternatives after a finding of functionality, as
Professor McCarthy suggests, that would still be consistent with construction of
the Inwood standard to focus exclusively on the role of the product feature, to
the exclusion of practical effect, competitive need, or the existence of
alternative features. As the Court made clear two paragraphs earlier in its
decision, competitive need, which would include a lack of acceptable
alternative features, is only relevant after a finding of nonfunctionality under
the Inwood test. In TrafFix, the plaintiff's dual-spring mechanism was
functional under the Inwood standard. Thus, it was unnecessary to consider the
question of alternatives, through application of the "competitive need" or
Qualitex standard.
Professor McCarthy is a highly respected and influential scholar of
trademarks, and the Federal Circuit was quick to follow his lead. In Valu
Engineering, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp.,230 the Federal Circuit found that TrafFix
did not alter the "Morton-Norwich analysis"23' that it had long applied to
determine functionality. As described earlier,2 32 this analysis evaluates the
likely impact of trade dress protection on competition through application of
several factors, including the availability of functionally equivalent features or
designs. 233 According to the Valu Engineering Court:
[T]he Morton-Norwich factors aid in the determination of whether a
particular feature is functional, and the third factor focuses on the
availability of "other alternatives ... ." We did not in the past under the
third factor require that the opposing party establish that there was a
"competitive necessity" for the product feature. Nothing in TrafFix
suggests that consideration of alternative designs is not properly part of the
overall mix, and we do not read the Court's observations in TrafFix as
rendering the availability of alternative designs irrelevant. Rather, we
230. Valu Eng'g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
231. See supra notes 95-109 and accompanying text (discussing Morton-Norwich).
232. Id.
233. Valu Eng'g, 278 F.3d at 1274 (citing In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d at
1340-41). The four factors are:
(1) the existence of a utility patent disclosing the utilitarian advantages of the
design; (2) advertising materials in which the originator of the design touts the
design's utilitarian advantages; (3) the availability to competitors of functionally
equivalent designs; and (4) facts indicating that the design results in a
comparatively simple or cheap method of manufacturing the product.
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conclude that the Court merely noted that once a product feature is found
functional based on other considerations, there is no need to consider the
availability of alternative designs, because the feature cannot be given trade
dress protection merely because there are alternative designs available. But
that does not mean that the availability of alternative designs cannot be a
legitimate source of evidence to determine whether a feature is functional in
the first place.
234
The Federal Circuit insisted that the "effect upon competition" remains the
"crux" of the functionality inquiry2 35 and held to its position that not all
"functional" features are foreclosed from trade dress protection: While de jure
functional features must be available to competitors, de facto functional
features (which the court has defined as features that play a useful function but
are not "functional" in the legal sense) are the proper subject of trade dress
protection.236 The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board follows the Federal
Circuit's lead and continues to apply the old Morton-Norwich standard.2 37
234. Id. at 1276 (footnotes and citations omitted). The Court went on to quote the same
passage from Professor McCarthy's treatise. I MCCARTHY, supra note 207, § 7:75, at 7-181 to
7-182.
235. Value Eng g, 278 F.3d at 1277.
236. Id. at 1274. For further discussion of this issue, see supra notes 95-109 and
accompanying text (discussing Morton-Norwich). The Ninth Circuit also has continued to
apply its four-factor, pre-TrafFix standard, which includes consideration of alternatives and
contemplates trade dress protection for "de facto functional" product features. See, e.g., Tie
Tech, Inc. v. Kinedyne Corp., 296 F.3d 778, 785 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that de facto
functionality may support trademark protection); Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251
F.3d 1252 (9th Cir. 2001) (retaining pre-TrafFix practical effect standard); see also Barber,
supra note 58, at 254 (characterizing Clicks as "remarkably inconsistent" with TralFix because
the Ninth Circuit found that the ultimate issue for purposes of functionality was whether there
were sufficient alternatives available to competitors and rejected the notion of "aesthetic
functionality"). However, in Talking Rain Beverage Co. v. S. Beach Beverage Co., 349 F.3d
601 (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit acknowledged TrafFix in finding a registered bottle
configuration functional. The Ninth Circuit found that the other three factors of its four-factor
test indicated that the bottle configuration was functional. Under these circumstances (and in
light of TralFix), "the mere existence of alternatives" could not render the configuration
nonfunctional. Id. at 604. The court nonetheless continued to recognize a distinction between
de facto and dejure functionality. Id. at 605 n.2.
District Courts in the Ninth Circuit have continued to apply the Circuit's traditional
practical effect standard. See, e.g., Big Island Candies, Inc. v. Cookie Corner, 244 F. Supp. 2d
1086, 1092 (D. Haw. 2003) (considering, among other things, the availability of alternative
designs); Adidas-Salomon AG v. Target Corp., 2002 WL 31971831, at *6 (D. Or. July 31,
2002) (applying a four-part test that includes consideration of alternatives); Computer Access
Tech. Corp. v. Catalyst Enters., Inc., 2001 WL 34118030, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2000)
(considering factors of the practical effect standard in its functionality analysis). Other District
Court opinions that have continued to apply pre-TraFix practical effect standards include EZ
Bowz, L.L.C. v. Prof'l Prod. Research Co., 2003 WL 22068573 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2003) and
Logan Graphic Prods., Inc. v. Textus USA, Inc., 2003 WL 21011746 (N.D. Ill. May 5, 2003)
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The Fifth Circuit, however, has not read TrafFix this way. Rather, in
Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz GMBH v. Ritter GMBH,238 the Fifth Circuit
recognized that Trafix created two separate tests for functionality-the
"traditional" Inwood test and the Qualitex competitive necessity test-and that
the TrafFix Court intended the traditional test to be "primary. ,239 The court
found that, under the traditional test, "if a product feature is 'the reason the
device works,' then the feature is functional. The availability of alternative
designs is irrelevant., 240  Moreover, "there is no need to consider the
'competitive necessity' test when a product feature is functional under the
traditional definition., 24' The Fifth Circuit went on to find that its prior test for
functionality, which focused "on the ability of competitors to compete




Still other district courts have demonstrated uncertainty about the proper standard after
TrafFix. For example, in Baughman Tile Co., Inc. v. Plastic Tubing, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 720,
722-23 (E.D.N.C. 2002), the court cited the Federal Circuit's opinion in Value Engineering but
refused to consider evidence of alternative features and suggested that there might be a conflict
between Value Engineering and TrafFix. In In re Dippin' Dots Patent Litigation, 249 F. Supp.
2d 1346, 1371-74 (N.D. Ga. 2003), the court applied the Inwood and Qualitex standards as
required by Traflix, but then cited to Value Engineering for the proposition that the Morton-
Norwich test is still valid, and applied it as well, finding functionality under all three standards.
237. Newborn Bros. & Co. v. Dripless, Inc., Opposition No. 113,471 (Aug. 16, 2002).
238. Eppendorf-Netherler-Hinz GMBH v. Ritter GMBH, 289 F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2002).
239. Id. at 355-56.
240. Id. at 355.
241. Id. at 356. The Fifth Circuit went on to note that prior to TrafFix, it had adopted a
"utilitarian" test of functionality which undertook to evaluate the impact of trade dress
protection on competition. For a brief discussion of the Fifth Circuit's utilitarian test, see supra
notes 115-17 and accompanying text. The Court continued:
This court's "utilitarian" test, with its focus on the ability of competitors to compete
effectively in the marketplace, is virtually identical to the "competitive necessity"
test discussed in TrafFix. Accordingly, TrafFix supersedes the definition of
functionality previously adopted by this court. The "utilitarian" test, although still
valid as a secondary test, is not a comprehensive definition of functionality. In
light of Traf Fix, the primary test for determining whether a product feature is
functional is whether the feature is essential to the use or purpose of the product or
whether it affects the cost or quality of the product.
Eppendorf-Netherler-Hinz GMBH, 289 F.3d at 356 (citations omitted). In a footnote, the Court
observed that the "utilitarian" definition of functionality had lowered the threshold for trade
dress protection and that a "product feature that satisfies the traditional definition of
functionality is not shielded from functional status merely because the feature is not a
competitive necessity." Id. at 356 n.4 (citations omitted).
242. Id. at 356. The trade dress at issue was the appearance of the plaintiffs line of
disposable pipette tips and dispenser syringes capable of accurate and rapid "multiple
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In line with the Fifth Circuit, the Second Circuit has opined, in dicta, that
Trajix has "curtail[ed] trade dress protection by expanding the functionality
doctrine" and has rejected the contention that a product feature can be "useful"
dispensing" of liquids, for use in laboratories and medical facilities. The pipette tips attached to
the dispenser syringes. The specific elements of alleged trade dress included:
(1) the flange on top of the tip; (2) the fins connecting the flange to the body of the
tip; (3) the plunger head; (4) the plunger; (5) the length of the tips; (6) the eight
sizes of the tips; (7) the coloring scheme on the tips; and (8) the angle of the stump
on the tips.
Id. at 354. The Fifth Circuit found the trade dress functional under the TrafFix "traditional"
(Inwood) standard. It is useful to review its reasoning in applying the standard:
In this case it is undisputed that the Combitip's fins provide necessary support for
the flange. Without the fins, the flange is subject to deformation. The only
testimony offered by Eppendorf to prove non-functionality of the fins related to the
existence of alternative design possibilities. Eppendorf's functionality expert
testified that the appearance and number of fins could be changed without affecting
the function of the fins. Eppendorf did not prove, however, that the fins are an
arbitrary flourish which serve no purpose in the Combitips. Rather, Eppendorf's
experts concede that fins of some shape, size or number are necessary to provide
support for the flange and to prevent deformation of the product. Thus, the fins are
design elements necessary to the operation of the product. Because the fins are
essential to the operation of the Combitips, they are functional as a matter of law,
and it is unnecessary to consider design alternatives available in the marketplace.
Likewise, a careful review of the record demonstrates that Eppendorf failed to
prove that the remaining Combitip design elements are unnecessary, non-essential
design elements. It is undisputed that: (1) The flange is necessary to connect the
Combitip to the dispenser syringe; (2) the rings on the plunger head are necessary
to lock the plunger into a cylinder in the dispenser syringe; (3) the plunger is
necessary to push liquids out of the tip, and the ribs on the plunger stabilize its
action; (4) the tips at the lower end of the Combitips are designed to easily fit into
test tubes and other receptacles; (5) the size of the Combitip determines the
dispensed volume, and size is essential to accurate and efficient dispensing; (6) the
color scheme used on the Combitip--clear plastic with black lettering---enables the
user easily to see and measure the amount of liquid in the Combitip, and black is
standard in the medical industry; and (7) the stumps of the larger Combitips must
be angled to separate air bubbles from the liquid and ensure that the full volume of
liquid is dispensed. Thus, all eight design elements identified by Eppendorf are
essential to the operation of the Combitips.
Eppendorf's theory of nonfunctionality focused on the existence of alternative
designs. Eppendorf's design expert summarized Eppendorfs approach to
functionality: "My conclusion was that to achieve the same functional purpose,
[the design elements identified by Eppendorf] can be changed significantly,
considerably without affecting the overall intended purpose." Although alternative
designs are relevant to the [old Fifth Circuit] test of functionality, alternative
designs are not germane to the traditional test for functionality. Each of the eight
design elements identified by Eppendorf is essential to the use or purpose of the
Combitips, and is not arbitrary or ornamental features.
Id. at 357-58 (citations omitted).
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but not "functional. 2 43 The Third Circuit has cited Eppendorf-Netherler-
Hinz GMBH with apparent approval and has construed TrafFix to extend
trade dress protection "only to incidental, arbitrary or ornamental product
features which identify the product's source." 244  Likewise, the Sixth
Circuit has found that "[t]he traditional Inwood test for functionality is the
main rule, and if a product is clearly functional under Inwood, a court need
not apply the competitive necessity test and its related inquiry concerning
the availability of alternative designs. 2 45 A sprinkling of district courts
appear to have followed the TrafFix lead, adopting a role of the feature
standard as the primary means of evaluating product feature trade dress
functionality.
246
243. Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Group of Am., Inc., 269 F.3d 114, 120 n.4 (2d Cir.
2001).
244. Shire US, Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 329 F.3d 348, 353-54 (3d Cir. 2003).
245. Antioch Co. v. West Trimming Corp., 347 F.3d 150, 155-56 (6th Cir. 2003). In
Antioch, the court noted the Federal Circuit's opinion in Valu Engineering and Professor
McCarthy's opinion in his treatise, that the availability of alternative designs is still relevant to
determining functionality under the Inwood test. The Sixth Circuit concluded:
We need not resolve the question of whether evidence of alternative designs has a
place outside of the competitive necessity test because at the very least, a court is
not required to examine alternative designs when applying the traditional test for
functionality. That much is clear from TrajfFix Devices, where the Supreme Court
applied Inwood in a straightforward fashion, without looking at alternative designs,
and found that the dual-spring design of the traffic sign in question was essential to
the stand's purpose because it kept the sign upright during inclement weather.
Id. The Sixth Circuit went on to uphold the district court's determination that the product
features at issue were functional under the Inwood test. Id. The district court had examined the
role the product features at issue played within the product, and had rejected proffered evidence
of alternative product designs. Id. at 156-57.
246. See, e.g., ASICS Corp. v. Target Corp., 282 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1026 (D. Minn. 2003)
(citing TrafFix for the proposition that a product feature is functional "if it is essential to the use
or purpose of the article" and finding that the Asics' two utility patents established functionality
of the stripe design and precluded trademark protection); Mark Brick Display Corp. v. Joseph
Struhl Co., 2003 WL 21696318, at *2 (D. R.[. July 9, 2003) (applying TrafFix's functionality
tests); Shock-Tek, L.L.C. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 2001 WL 1680191, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 18,
2001) (supporting TrafFix's reasoning for determining functionality).
61 WASH. &LEE L. REV 79 (2004)
V The TrafFix Decision in a Larger Legal Context
TrajFix is already the subject of criticism 247 and dispute.248  The
confusion this opinion generated, like the confusion that prevented the
courts of appeals from attaining a uniform standard of functionality prior to
TrafFix, may be attributable, at least in part, to a lack of clarity about the
theoretical foundation for the functionality doctrine. While most would
agree that the functionality doctrine is intended, directly or indirectly, to
foster competition, there are competing views about the doctrine's specific
source and justification. Commentators have cited several theoretical
foundations, or touchstones, for the functionality doctrine. First,
commentators have sometimes attributed the functionality doctrine to the
rationale of the Sears/Compco/Bonito Boats line of cases, which holds that
things falling within the subject matter of patents should remain in the
public domain, available to competitors, unless patented.249 Second,
commentators have attributed the functionality doctrine to a policy decision
to avoid undercutting utility patents. 250  Third, commentators have
247. See, e.g., Weinberg, supra note 52, at 5-6 (criticizing TrajFix). Weinberg argues:
TrafFix may make [the task of distinguishing functional design features from
nonfunctional ones] more difficult and the functionality doctrine more opaque.
Potentially TrafFLx's worst mischief is that courts may read it to preclude
employing the "fulcrum" upon which successful functionality analysis often turns:
whether there are functionally-equivalent alternative design features to substitute
for a design feature claimed to be protected against unauthorized copying by
trademark principles .... Tra./Fix may cause other trouble as well. For example, it
needlessly states two functionality standards, one for useful design features and one
for aesthetic design features. Tra/Fix also casts a cloud over the principle that
when a decision maker decides whether a product's overall configuration is
functional, that configuration should be viewed in its entirety, and not as discrete
individual design features.
Id.; see also Renke, supra note 174, at 627 ("[P]reservation of our competitive economy does
not seem served by allowing others to mimic a valuable source identifier without good reason,
merely because the feature is useful, or it affects the cost or quality of the article."); 2001 Panel
Discussion, supra note 174, at 526 (statement by Inna Fayenson, Esq.) ("The Court mixes and
matches doctrines and justifications and distinguishes its own precedents just to get to the
ultimate decision on the facts. The result.., is that.., the Court ... has created even more
uncertainty in the area of trade dress.").
248. See supra notes 231, 238-40 and accompanying text (discussing two contrary views
of TrafFix). Compare Valu Eng'g v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 1275-76 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(interpreting TrafFix) with Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz GMBH v. Ritter GMBH, 289 F.3d 35 1,
355-57 (5th Cir. 2002) (interpreting TrafFix).
249. See infra Part V.A (relating the functionality doctrine to the Sears/Compco/Bonito
Boats line of cases).
250. See infra Part V.B (discussing the role of functionality with regard to both utility and
design patent protection).
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frequently described the doctrine as emanating from a general public policy
favoring free competition. 251 Finally, commentators have sometimes
connected functionality with the doctrine of the "public bargain," attributed
to the Supreme Court's decisions in Singer Manufacturing Co. v. June
Manufacturing Co.25 2 and Kellogg that hold that in return for granting a
patent, the public receives the right to copy the patented invention upon the
expiration of the patent term.25 3
Perhaps what makes TrafFix difficult to grasp is that it seems to
borrow from all of these theoretical foundations, but is not fully consistent
with any one of them. This Part examines the compatibility of the TrafFix
formulation with each of the theoretical touchstones described above. It
concludes that the Supreme Court has taken steps to conform the
functionality doctrine more nearly to the Sears/Compco/Bonito Boats
rationale. While the Sears/Compco/Bonito Boats line of cases addressed
the question of state unfair competition protection for product features,
TrafFix indicates that the policy considerations enunciated in those cases
should shape Lanham Act protection for product features, as well.
A. The Sears/Compco/Bonito Boats Line of Cases
In Sears and Compco, the Court considered whether federal patent law
preempted the use of state unfair competition laws to prohibit the copying
of unpatented product features.25 4 Courts had found the products in both
cases undeserving of either a utility or a design patent. 2ss In each case the
Supreme Court found the state unfair competition claim preempted. 25 6 The
Court reasoned that the patent laws represent a careful balance of rights to
accommodate potentially conflicting public policies: (1) providing property
rights as an incentive to invent, and (2) maintaining a competitive
251. See infra Part V.C (describing the relationship between functionality and the general
policy of encouraging competition).
252. Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896).
253. See infra Part V.D (discussing functionality in the public bargain context).
254. See U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2. (declaring federal law superior to state law); see also
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 228 (1964) (addressing preemption);
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234,234 (1964) (same).
255. See Sears, 376 U.S. at 231 (noting that the article in question was not entitled to a
patent); Compco, 376 U.S. at 237 (finding that there was no valid patent protection).
256. See Sears, 376 U.S. at 232-33 (finding that federal patent law preempted state law);
Compco, 376 U.S. at 239 (same).
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marketplace by permitting free use of others' ideas.257 Congress reached
this accommodation to provide "monopolies" of limited duration for the
most important inventions, for which the need for incentive is greatest (those
inventions that meet the standards of novelty, nonobviousness, and usefulness,
or in the case of design patents, novelty, nonobviousness, and omamentality).258
In imposing those high standards, Congress intended that all inventions that fail
to qualify for patent protection would remain in the public domain, free for
competitors to use at will.2 59 If the states were able to step in and offer their
own protection for unpatented inventions, this would interfere unacceptably
with Congress's careful balance.2 60 As the Court explained in Compco:
To forbid copying would interfere with the federal policy, found in Art. I,
§ 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution and in the implementing federal statutes, of
allowing free access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws
leave in the public domain. Here Day-Brite's fixture has been held not to
be entitled to a design or mechanical patent. Under the federal patent laws
it is, therefore, in the public domain and can be copied in every detail by
whoever pleases.
26 1
During the next two decades the Supreme Court seemed to move away
from the strict views it embraced in Sears and Compco. 262 The Court, however,
returned to the basic rationale of Sears and Compco in Bonito Boats. In Bonito
257. See Sears, 376 U.S. at 230-31 (discussing the careful balancethat the patent system
creates and preserves).
258. See id. at 230 (describing the strict observance of durational limits of patent
protection).
259. See id. at 231 (discussing the public right to copy inventions that do not qualify for
patents).
260. See id. at 231-32 (discussing impermissible state encroachment of federal objectives).
261. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234,237-38 (1964). The Court
added:
That an article copied from an unpatented article could be made in some other way,
that the design is "nonfunctional" and not essential to the use of either article, that
the configuration of the article copied may have a "secondary meaning" which
identifies the maker to the trade, or that there may be "confusion" among
purchasers as to which article is which or as to who is the maker, may be relevant
evidence in applying a State's law requiring such precautions as labeling; however,
and regardless of the copier's motives, neither these facts nor any others can furnish
a basis for imposing liability for or prohibiting the actual acts of copying and
selling.
Id. at 238.
262. See, e.g., Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 266 (1979) (finding no
conflict between federal patent law and state contract laws); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,
416 U.S. 470, 491 (1974) (finding no preemption of trade secret law); Goldstein v. California,
412 U.S. 546, 571 (1973) (upholding a state law prohibiting sound recording).
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Boats, the Court again had to decide "what limits the operation of the federal
patent system places on the States' ability to offer substantial protection to
utilitarian and design ideas which the patent laws leave otherwise
unprotected. 2 63 As in Sears and Compco, the Bonito Boats Court emphasized
patent law's "careful balance between the need to promote innovation and the
recognition that imitation and refinement through imitation are both necessary
to invention itself and the very lifeblood of a competitive economy."264 The
Court emphasized the importance under the patent law not only of protecting
qualifying inventions but also of retaining all other inventions in the public
domain:
The attractiveness of [the patent] bargain, and its effectiveness in inducing
creative effort and disclosure of the results of that effort, depend almost
entirely on a backdrop of free competition in the exploitation ofunpatented
designs and innovations. The novelty and nonobviousness requirements of
patentability embody a congressional understanding, implicit in the Patent
Clause itself, that free exploitation of ideas will be the rule, to which the
protection of a federal patent is the exception. Moreover, the ultimate goal
of the patent system is to bring new designs and technologies into the
public domain through disclosure. State law protection for techniques and
designs whose disclosure has already been induced by market rewards may
conflict with the very purpose of the patent laws by decreasing the range of
ideas available as the building blocks of further innovation. The offer of
federal protection from competitive exploitation of intellectual property
would be rendered meaningless in a world where substantially similar state
law protections were readily available. To a limited extent, the federal
patent laws must determine not only what is protected, but also what is free
for all to use.265
The Bonito Boats opinion reiterated that:
[A]n injunction against copying of an unpatented article, freely available to
the public, irnpermissibly "[interferes] with the federal policy, found in Art.
I, § 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution and in the implementing federal statutes, of
allowing free access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws
leave in the public domain."26
263. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 143 (1989).
264. Id. at 146. The Court devoted considerable discussion to the ways in which the Patent
Act accommodates and promotes these potentially competing interests. See id. at 147-51
(discussing the balance between incentive and access).
265. Id. at 151.
266. Id. at 153 (quoting Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237
(1964)).
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The Bonito Boats Court noted that the "pre-emptive sweep" of its
decisions in Sears and Compco had been "the subject of heated scholarly and
judicial debate 2 67 and acknowledged that "[r]ead at their highest level of
generality, the two decisions could be taken to stand for the proposition that the
States are completely disabled from offering any form of protection to articles
or processes which fall within the broad scope of patentable subject matter. 263
However, the Court cautioned that "such a broad pre-emptive principle" should
not be extrapolated from these cases.2 69 The Court concluded:
At the heart of Sears and Compco is the conclusion that the efficient
operation of the federal patent system depends upon substantially free trade
in publicly known, unpatented design and utilitarian conceptions .... Both
the novelty and the nonobviousness requirements of federal patent law are
grounded in the notion that concepts within the public grasp, or those so
obvious that they readily could be, are the tools of creation available to all.
They provide the baseline of free competition upon which the patent
system's incentive to creative effort depends. A state law that substantially
interferes with the enjoyment of an unpatented utilitarian or design
conception which has been freely disclosed by its author to the public at
large impermissibly contravenes the ultimate goal of public disclosure and
use which is the centerpiece of federal patent policy. Moreover, through
the creation of patent-like rights, the States could essentially redirect
inventive efforts away from the careful criteria of patentability developed
by Congress over the last 200 years. We understand this to be the
reasoning at the core of our decisions in Sears and Compco, and we affirm
that reasoning today.270
267. Id. at 154.
268. Id.
269. See id. (explaining the Court's prior decisions). Bonito Boat noted that Sears
acknowledged states' continued ability to protect businesses in the use of packaging trade dress.
While this trade dress was potentially the subject matter of design patents, Sears indicated that
the states could impose "limited regulations on the circumstances in which such designs are
used" in order to prevent consumer confusion. Id.
The Bonito Boat Court explained that decisions post-Sears delineated the scope of federal
preemption of state regulation of patentable subject matter. See id. at 155 (discussing case law
subsequent to Sears). In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974), the Court
upheld state trade secret protection of secret industrial processes, finding that this protection did
not conflict too greatly with the federal policies of encouraging patentable invention and prompt
disclosure of innovations. See id. at 484 (finding no preemption of state law). The Kewanee
finding rested on several factors, including the fact that trade secrets are not in the public
domain, trade secret protection is considerably weaker than patent protection, and trade secret
law protects noneconomic interests outside the sphere of congressional concern in enacting the
patent laws. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 155-56 (1989)
(explaining the rationale behind Kenawee).
270. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 156-57.
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Obviously, the Sears line of cases addressed the relationship of state and
federal law, and the ability of state law to protect subject matter that federal law
relegates to the public domain. Because the Lanham Act is federal law, the
Supremacy Clause will not preempt it, as it did the state unfair competition
laws in Sears and Compco. One can certainly argue that Sears, Compco, and
Bonito Boats do not affect the ability of Congress or the federal courts to
extend trade dress protection to unpatentable product features pursuant to the
Lanham Act.
271
On the other hand, Compco and Bonito Boats both grounded the policy of
relegating unpatentable product features to the public domain in the
Constitution itself,272 which suggests a limit on Congress's power to rely on
other constitutional powers, such as the Commerce Clause, to remove product
features from the public domain.273 Moreover, the decisions' recognition that
271. See, e.g., Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 138 F.3d 277, 286 (7th Cir. 1998)
("in Bonito Boats and Sears, the Supreme Court examined the relationship between federal
patent law and state unfair competition law, not between federal patent law and federal
trademark law. The holdings of these cases, then, has [sic] no effect on the scope of federal
trademark or unfair competition law."); Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1241 (6th Cir.
199 1) (stating that the Sears/Compco/Bonito Boats cases do not apply to the Lanham Act); In re
Honeywell, Inc., 497 F.2d 1344, 1349 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (distinguishing federal trademark laws
from the Sears/Compco/Bonito Boats cases); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 189-90
(2003) (rejecting the suggestion that the Sears/Compco/Bonito Boats line of cases limits
Congress's authority to extend the duration of federal copyrights).
272. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 153 (1989) (relying on
the Constitution for the federal policy of allowing free access to articles in the public domain);
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964) (stating that the
Constitution requires free access to articles in the public domain).
273. See Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Copying in the Shadow of the Constitution: The Rational
Limits of Trade Dress Protection, 80 MINN. L. REV. 595,611-18 (1996) (discussing preemption
in the Supreme Court's line of product feature cases); supra notes 223-26 and accompanying
text (discussing the constitutional issues arising from the Lanham Act's protection of product
features); see also Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc., 12 F.3d 632,646-47 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cudahy, J.,
dissenting) (footnotes omitted) (discussing preemption). Judge Cudahy wrote:
[The majority argues] that Sears, Compco and Bonito Boats are concerned with the
interface between federal patent law and the state law of unfair competition. The
cases therefore merely involve application of the Supremacy Clause and federal
preemption of state law. Superficially, this argument may have some appeal but it
ignores the fact that the Lanham Act (comprising the federal law of trademarks and
unfair competition) essentially federalizes the common law of trademarks and
unfair competition. And the Lanham Act provides a federal trademark register to
which generally recognized principles of notice may be applied. Therefore, the
conflict that the Court found between state law and federal patent law as a
prerequisite to preemption in Sears, Compco, and Bonito Boats is exactly the same
conflict as would develop between federal patent law and federal trademark law if a
design patent could be made perpetual by trademarking the design. As a matter of
commercial reality, therefore, the relation of patent law to state unfair competition
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the success of the patent system depends on the unfettered exploitation of
unpatented products itself suggests that Congress may never have intended a
broad or systematic extension of federal trade dress protection to product
features.274 Federal trade dress protection presumably would undercut the
patent system just as state trade dress protection would, given that the Lanham
Act is based upon common-law unfair competition doctrine.275
In any event, regardless of whether the policy set forth in the Sears line of
cases technically limits Congress or the federal courts in providing federal
protection for product feature trade dress, the Supreme Court clearly finds it a
relevant policy in construing the Lanham Act.2 76 In providing its definition of
law is exactly the same as its relation to federal trademark law.
The conflict, then, is directly between a federal statutory scheme rooted in the
Constitution and a federal codification of the common law. As the Court noted in
Bonito Boats, the Lanham Act's federalization of the common law of unfair
competition reflects a congressional affirmation of policies that must be made
conformable with the constitutionally rooted patent laws:
Congress has thus given federal recognition to many of the concerns that underlie
the state tort of unfair competition, and the application of Sears and Compco to
nonfunctional aspects of a product which has been shown to identify sources must
take account of competing federal policies in this regard.
Kohler, 12 F.3d at 646-47 (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (quoting Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 166).
274. Extension of trademark and unfair competition protection to product features was
accomplished entirely through judicial decisions. See In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671
F.2d 1332, 1336 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (describing the genesis of trademark law). The Lanham Act
provides protection for "symbols" and "devices," which courts construed broadly to include
product feature trade dress. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052, 1125(a); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 209 (2000) (noting courts' broad interpretation of Lanham
Act). In 1999, Congress amended Lanham Act Section 43(a) to specify the burden of proof in
Lanham Act actions involving unregistered "trade dress." 15 U.S.C. § 11 25(a)(3). This is the
only express reference to trade dress in the Lanham Act. There is no specific reference to trade
dress protection for product features.
275. See generally I MCCARTHY, supra note 207, §§ 7:96-7:99; see also Kohler, 12 F.3d
at 646-47 (Cudahy, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe Lanham Act... essentially federalizes the common
law of trademarks and unfair competition.").
276. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 123 S.Ct. 2041, 2048-50
(2003) (interpreting the Lanham Act). In this case the Supreme Court relied on the
Sears/Compco/Bonito Boats line of cases to reject a construction of Lanham Act Section 43(a)
that would provide rights in the subject matter of an expired copyright. The Court explained
that to construe the Lanham Act to provide a cause of action would:
cause[] the Lanham Act to conflict with the law of copyright, which addresses that
subject specifically. The right to copy, and to copy without attribution, once a
copyright has expired, like "the right to make [an article whose patent has
expired]-including the right to make it in precisely the shape it carried when
patented-passes to the public ... ." In general, unless an intellectual property
right such as a patent or copyright protects an item, it will be subject to
copying...." [l]n construing the Lanham Act, we have been "careful to caution
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functionality in Inwood, the Court cited Sears.277 Sears, however, provides no
definition of functionality, nor does it address the issue of functionality. The
Court must have cited Sears for the policy that unpatented product features
should remain available to competitors and it must have intended to link the
definition of functionality to that policy. Likewise, in TrafFix, the Supreme
Court commenced its discussion of the functionality doctrine with a reference
to Bonito Boats and the policy that unless a product is patented or copyrighted,
it generally "will be subject to copying. ' 278  Courts of appeals and
commentators have also related the doctrine of functionality to the policy set
forth in Sears, Compco, and Bonito Boats.27 9
How, then, do the Supreme Court's definitions of functionality in TrafFix
stand up against the policy set forth in Sears/Compco/Bonito Boats? Taken
against misuse or over-extension" of trademark and related protections into areas
traditionally occupied by patent or copyright.
Id. at 2048 (citations omitted). Citing Bonito Boats, the Court went on to explain that "allowing
a cause of action under § 43(a)... would create a species of mutant copyright law that limits the
public's federal right to copy and use expired copyrights." Id. at 2048 (internal quotes omitted).
The Court added that to find the proposed Lanham Act cause of action "would be akin to
finding that § 43(a) created a species of perpetual patent and copyright, which Congress may not
do." Id. at 2050.
277. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. lves Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844,850-51 n. 10 (1982) (stating
that a product feature is functional if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it
affects the cost or quality of the article) (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S.
225, 232 (1964)).
278. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001) (discussing
copying). Specifically, the Court stated:
Trade dress protection must subsist with the recognition that in many instances
there is no prohibition against copying goods and products. In general, unless an
intellectual property right such as a patent or copyright protects an item, it will be
subject to copying. As the Court has explained, copying is not always discouraged
or disfavored by the laws which preserve our competitive economy .... Allowing
competitors to copy will have salutary effects in many instances. "Reverse
engineering of chemical and mechanical articles in the public domain often leads to
significant advances in technology."
Id. at 29 (citations omitted).
279. See, e.g., Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc., 12 F.3d 632,644-51 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cudahy, J.,
dissenting) (relating the functionality doctrine to the Sears/Comco/Bonito Boat cases);
Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of Am., Inc., 9 F.3d 1091, 1103-04 (4th Cir. 1993) (Niemeyer,
J. dissenting) (discussing functionality doctrine); Stormy Clime, Ltd. v. Progroup, Inc., 809 F.2d
971,977-78 (2d Cir. 1987) (discussing Sears within a general explanation of the functionality
doctrine); Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 824 (3d Cir. 1981) (discussing
functionality); Davis, supra note 273, at 619-27 (discussing the application of a
nonfunctionality requirement after the Sears/Comco/Bonito Boats decisions); Dratler, supra
note 2, at 923 (explaining the Sears/Comco/Bonito Boats decisions); Welkowitz, supra note 79,
at 331-42 (discussing the functionality doctrine).
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literally, the Sears line of cases would suggest that trademark and trade dress
protection should not apply to unpatented product features that are within the
subject matter of either utility or design patent protection. Even in Bonito
Boats, in which the Court purported to back away from a strict construction of
Sears and Compco, the Court reaffirmed the reasoning that "the efficient
operation of the federal patent system depends upon substantially free trade in
publicly known, unpatented design and utilitarian conceptions .... They
provide the baseline of free completion upon which the patent system's
incentive to creative effort depends.
280
By rejecting competitive necessity as the primary test of functionality, and
asking instead whether the product feature "is essential (material or important)
to the use or purpose of the article" or "affects the cost or quality of the article,"
the TrafFix Court moved the functionality standard closer to the Sears/Bonito
Boats policy. 21 First, as discussed earlier,282 the Court's discussion indicated
that the Inwood standard should encompass any product feature that is material
or important to the use or purpose of the product, or affects its cost or quantity,
and should exclude only those features that are essentially arbitrary or
incidental.28 3 Under this construction, significantly fewer product features that
are within the subject matter of utility patents will be eligible for federal trade
dress protection. In accord with the policies disclosed in Bonito Boat,
competitors will have access to a wide range of "building blocks" that were
previously unavailable under the competitive necessity or practical effect
standard adopted in many circuits.
Second, the Inwood standard, as construed, is more philosophically
compatible with the Sears/CompcolBonito Boats line of cases than is the
competitive necessity standard. Sears/Compco/Bonito Boats asserted a need
for access to unpatented product features across the board, as a general rule, in
order for the patent system to work as intended and to accomplish its
enumerated purposes and an overall fostering of competition. 28 4 There is no
place in this vision for the case-by-case assessment of an individual
competitor's actual need for a particular unpatented feature in a particular
market, at a particular time. Such a case-by-case assessment only considers
part of the picture-it does not take into account the overall impact that case-
280. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 156 (1989).
281. See Barber, supra note 58, at 252 (discussing TrafFix's rejection of the competitive
necessity standard).
282. See supra Part IV.B-D (discussing TrafFix's application of Inwood).
283. See id. (discussing the Inwood standard).
284. See supra notes 271-75 and accompanying text (discussing the policy behind the
Sears/Compco/Bonito Boats cases).
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by-case trade dress protection will have on accomplishment of the multiple
goals of the patent system. As the Bonito Boats decision explained, the "very
purpose of the patent laws" was to increase "the range of ideas available as the
building blocks of further innovation. ' 28 5 The practical effect of functionality
standards conflicts with this undertaking by removing design ideas from the
public domain. Moreover, a standard embracing case-by-case evaluation
imposes uncertainty and invites litigation, which will discourage the kind of
free imitation that the Patent Act, as construed in Bonito Boats, was intended to
foster.286 As construed by the TraiFix Court, the Inwood standard, in contrast,
is closer to a bright-line rule that eliminates protection for all product features
that play a material or important role within the product. Protection of such
features, regardless of the availability of alternatives, would undermine the
multiple goals of the patent law.
TralFix, however, does not fully conform the functionality doctrine to the
Sears/Compco/Bonito Boats line of cases. The reasoning of
Sears/Compco/Bonito Boats applies equally to the subject matter of utility
patents and design patents. This would dictate that ornamental features, which
are the subject matter of design patents, would also be generally exempted from
287trade dress protection. Tra)Fix adopted a rule that would prevent trade dress
protection for most or all useful product features. It did not adopt a rule that
would prevent protection of most or all ornamental product features. Courts
may deem some ornamental product features functional and thus unprotectable
under the Inwood standard.288 Other ornamental products features clearly will
285. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 151.
286. See Brief for Petitioner at 11-12, TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532
U.S. 23 (2001) (No. 99-1571) (arguing that the factual inquiry of the "competitive need"
standard stifles competition and creates litigation).
287. Judge Cudahy made this point forcefully in his now famous dissent in Kohler:
[Tihere is no basis for treating the subject matter of design and utility patents
differently: if functional matter not protected by a utility patent is available for all
to copy, then it follows that ornamental or aesthetic designs not protected by design
patents are also free for everyone to copy. Design and utility patents are created by
the same law .... There is nothing in the patent law itself that would allow a
distinction to be made between design and utility patents for purposes of extending
trademark protection to one but not to the other. To the contrary, the law
applicable to utility patents applies to design patents as well: "The provisions of
this title relating to patents for inventions shall apply to patents for designs, except
as otherwise provided."
Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 648 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted); see Welkowitz, supra note 79, at 334 (discussing the varying standards for
functionality).
288. See supra note 218 (discussing how ornamental product features can be deemed
functional).
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not be deemed functional, and thus will be subject to the Qualitex or
competitive necessity standard. Under this standard, courts will deem an
ornamental product feature functional if its exclusive use "would put
competitors at a significant nonreputation-related disadvantage. '"2 89 This will
entail a case-by-case examination of the impact of protection on competitors in
the particular market at issue. Presumably, as long as sufficient alternative
product decoration features are available to the defendants, no competitive
necessity will be found.290
Thus, TrafFix may be a logical "next step" after Bonito Boats in adopting
a functionality standard that will maintain useful product features in the public
domain to serve as building blocks for competition and further invention, and
as a backdrop for the patent system. However, in adopting separate standards
for useful product features and purely ornamental product features, TrafFix
drew a distinction that did not exist in Sears/Compco/Bonito Boats and failed
to explain why it did so.
291
B. The Policy to Avoid Undercutting Utility Patents
Rather than directly relating the functionality doctrine to the
Sears/Compco/Bonito Boats line of cases, a number of authorities have
suggested that the primary purpose of the functionality doctrine is to avoid use
of trade dress protection to undercut utility patents. As Professor McCarthy has
put it:
[One] rationale for the functionality bar is that the policy of free and open
competition prohibits trade dress from creating "back-door patents,"
substituting for the strict requirements of utility patent law. Therefore it
follows that under this rationale, the test of what is "functional" should be
very similar to that of patent law. That is, "functional" features or designs
should be defined as those that are driven by practical, engineering-type
considerations .... Under this rationale, these kind [sic] of utilitarian
considerations should form the basis for the determination of what is
"functional."
289. See id. (discussing the Qualitex standard).
290. See id. (discussing competitive necessity in relation to ornamental product features).
291. The TrafFix Court also avoided ruling on the suggestion set forth in Compco and
Bonito Boats that the right to copy unpatented product features is constitutionally compelled.
See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 35 (2001)(declining to address
the constitutional issues).
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... If there is to be an exclusive right for functional features, such
protection can only be gained by utility patent protection limited in time,
not perpetual protection under trademark law.
2 2
Authorities promoting this approach have argued that the functionality
doctrine is not (or should not be) concerned with the possibility of trade dress
protection undercutting or overlapping design patents293 because trade dress
292. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 207, § 7:64 (footnote omitted); see also Dratler, supra note
2, at 938-39 (discussing functionality). Dratler explained:
At its core, the functionality doctrine is based upon a simple premise: trademark
law should not provide a shortcut to achieve perpetual utility patent protection.
Thus the fundamental meaning of the word "function" in the doctrine's name is not
merely any purpose, but a useful or utilitarian purpose in the utility patent sense. If
a feature of an article is dictated by such a useful purpose, it is functional and must
be protected, if at all, by a utility patent.
Dratler, supra note 2, at 938-39; see also Valu Eng'g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268,
1273 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (discussing the purpose of the functionality doctrine); W.T. Rogers Co. v.
Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 337-38 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting the role of functionality in
accommodating Section 43 and patent law); Kevin E. Mohr, At the Interface of Patent and
Trademark Law: Should a Product Configuration Disclosed in a Utility Patent Ever Qualify
for Trade Dress Protection?, 19 HASTUNGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 339, 380-81 (1977) ("The
functionality doctrine has several policies or goals. The primary goal, which effectively
encompasses the others, is simply that trademark law should not provide a means to obtain
perpetual utility patent protection for features that are not patentable.").
293. Design patents are by definition reserved for "ornamental," as opposed to "functional,"
product designs. 35 U.S.C. § 171. "Design patents do not and cannot include claims to the
structural or functional aspects of the article." Lee v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 838 F.2d 1186,
1188 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Whether a design is "ornamental" for purposes of a design patent
depends on whether the design was "dictated by the function of the article." See Berry Sterling
Corp. v. Pescor Plastics, Inc., 122 F.3d 1452, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (stating the test to
determine if a design is ornamental for purposes of a design patent). This determination must
rest on analysis of the claimed design's overall appearance. Id. Courts may consider the
availability of alternative designs as evidence that a challenged design is not functional. See id.
at 1455-56 (discussing the relevance of alternate designs). The Federal Circuit has explained
that other appropriate considerations might include:
[W]hether the protected design represents the best design; whether alternative
designs would adversely affect the utility of the specified article; whether there are
any concomitant utility patents; whether the advertising touts particular features of
the design as having specific utility; and whether there are any elements in the
design or an overall appearance clearly not dictated by function.
1d. at 1455; see generally I MCCARTHY, supra note 207.
Courts have sometimes held that the fact that a product design is the subject of a design
patent is relevant evidence of nonfunctionality in support of trade dress protection. See, e.g., In
re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1232, 1342 n.3 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (finding a former
design patent relevant evidence of nonfunctionality). A former patent, however, has not been
considered to be conclusive in itself. See In re Am. Nat'l Can Co., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1841, 1843
(T.T.A.B. 1997) (stating that a design patent is not conclusive evidence of nonfunctionality); I
MCCARTHY, supra note 207, § 6:11, at nn. 19 & 20 (listing relevant case law).
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laws and design patents serve different, equally legitimate federal purposes.294
Moreover, trade dress protection provides a weaker and narrower form of
protection for aesthetic product features than design patents. In contrast to the
"monopoly" rights provided by a design patent, the Lanham Act: (1) only
provides relief when a defendant's similar aesthetic product features cause a
likelihood of consumer confusion;295 (2) permits flexible remedies that enable
courts to tailor relief narrowly and avoid injunctions that stop production and
distribution of a defendant's products;296 and (3) requires that trade dress be
distinctive in order to limit protection to those product features and designs that
294. See, e.g., In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 930 (C.C.P.A. 1964)
(discussing the respective purposes of trade dress law and design patent law). The court
explained:
In our opinion, trademark rights, or rights under the law of unfair competition,
which happen to continue beyond the expiration of a design patent, do not "extend"
the patent monopoly. They exist independently of it, under different law and for
different reasons. The termination of either has no legal effect on the continuance
of the other. When the patent monopoly ends, it ends. The trademark rights do not
extend it. We know of no provision of patent law, statutory or otherwise, that
guarantees to anyone an absolute right to copy the subject matter of any expired
patent. Patent expiration is nothing more than the cessation of the patentee's right
to exclude held under the patent law. Conversely, trademarks conceivably could
end through nonuse during the life of a patent. We doubt it would be argued that
the patent rights should also expire so as not to "extend" them.
Id. A later decision by the same court explained:
[The holding in Mogen David] recognized the clear distinction between the
underlying bases of the federal trademark and design patent laws. Federal design
patent laws were created to encourage the invention of ornamental designs. Federal
trademark laws, which are independent in origin from the design patent laws, seek
to prevent the public from encountering confusion, mistake, and deception in the
purchase of goods and services and to protect the integrity of the trademark owner's
product identity. With that distinction in mind, this court decided that the public
interest-protection from confusion, mistake, and deception in the purchase of
goods and services-must prevail over any alleged extension of design patent
rights, when a trademark is nonfunctional [the court defined functional as "in
essence utilitarian or dictated for reasons of engineering efficiency"] and does in
fact serve as a means to distinguish the goods of the trademark owner from those of
others.
In re Honeywell, Inc., 497 F.2d 1344, 1348 (C.C.P.A. 1974); see also I MCCARTHY, supra note
207, § 7:91 (discussing the relationship between trademark law and design patent law).
295. See, e.g., W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d. 334, 337 (7th Cir. 1985)
(distinguishing trademark and design patents); I McCARTHY, supra note 207, § 7:91 (discussing
consumer confusion); Dratler, supra note 2, at 928-30 (explaining the "likelihood of confusion"
standard). But see Welkowitz, supra note 79, at 321-30 (arguing that the "likelihood of
confusion" standard, as applied, "is a tenuous basis to distinguish trade dress infringement from
a simple prohibition on copying").
296. See Dratler, supra note 2, at 930-33 (discussing the flexibility of the trademark
infringement remedy).
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enjoy secondary meaning.2 97 In line with their view that the functionality
doctrine should only mediate between trade dress protection and utility patents,
a number of proponents of this rationale have rejected the concept of"aesthetic
functionality" altogether.298
Thus, under this approach to functionality, courts should deem only those
product features that are useful, practical, or driven by engineering
considerations as functional and unprotectable. Ornamental product features
and designs should not be excluded from protection under the functionality
doctrine. Arguably, the closer the functionality doctrine comes to
approximating the "usefulness" standard of utility patent law, 299 the more
effective it will be in preventing trade dress protection from undercutting utility
patents.3°
297. See id. at 933-35 (discussing distinctiveness); see generally Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000) (interpreting the Lanham Act). But see Thomas F.
Cotter, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?: Resolving an Ostensible Conflict Between Patent
Law and Federal Trademark Law, 3 MARQUETrE INTELL. PROP. REV. 25, 69-70 (1999)
(questioning whether distinctions between design patent and trade dress protection are
meaningful). Professor Cotter notes that it "may not be all that difficult to prove secondary
meaning in a design that has been the subject of a commercially successful design patent." Id. at
69. Further, under the Gorham "eye of the ordinary observer" test of design patent
infringement, "a person claiming infringement of a design patent must prove something rather
similar to likelihood of confusion." Id. at 69-70; see also Welkowitz, supra note 79, at 351
(arguing that the tests used to determine both validity and infringement of design patents and
trade dress are similar, which suggests that "patents are not adequately shielded from
encroachment by trade dress protection of designs").
Notably, the same rationale that commentators apply to differentiate design patents and
trade dress protection also applies to differentiate utility patents and trade dress protection.
Thus it remains unclear why trade dress protection may undermine one form of patent but not
the other. See Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 648 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cudahy, J.,
dissenting) (noting the separate treatment of design patents and trade dress protection). For a
discussion of Judge Cudahy's dissent, see supra note 287 and accompanying text.
298. See, e.g., Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417,427-28 (5th Cir. 1984)
(criticizing "aesthetic functionality" cases); In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1048-50
(C.C.P.A. 1982) (discussing "aesthetic functionality"); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 207, § 7:80
("The notion of 'aesthetic functionality' is an unwarranted and illogical expansion of the
functionality policy, carrying it far outside the utilitarian rationale that created the policy.");
Dratler, supra note 2, at 942 (stating that the functionality doctrine should not expand into
aesthetics).
299. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new or useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent therefore."). An invention is useful when it provides a specific benefit in
currently available form. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966) (stating the
usefulness standard).
300. In fact, however, many of the proponents of this approach to the functionalitydoctrine
have advocated a practical effect standard of functionality, which only withholds trade dress
protection for product features for which there is competitive need, or insufficient equally good
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The TrafFix decision does bring the standard for determining functionality
closer to the usefulness standard for utility patents. As discussed earlier, courts
adopting a practical effect standard of functionality reasoned that product
features could perform a useful function other than identifying source (that is,
be "de facto functional") but still be protected as trade dress. Courts deemed
only de jure functional product features unprotectable. As Professor Oddi has
explained:
The generally adopted definition of de jure functionality in trademark law
is whether there is a competitive need to copy that is tested by whether or
not there are available alternatives. A configuration is only de facto
functional if that same utility may be achieved in a variety ofways. Indeed,
to be excluded from registration on the ground of functionality the
particular design must be "superior" to be de jure functional. In contrast,
patent law treats utility in a broader sense, i.e., that the particular product
serve a practical, commercial end. Not only does the invention work (i.e.,
is operable) but also it must have some useful commercial application. To
be protected, a new and nonobvious invention need not be "superior"; it
need not be the "best"; it need only be "useful.
0'°
In focusing on the relationship of the feature to the use or purpose of the
product, and on whether the feature affects the cost or quality of the product,
and in eliminating consideration of the availability of alternatives or
"competitive need," the TrajFix Court brought the functionality doctrine much
closer to a simple "usefulness" standard such as is employed under utility patent
law. This is logically consistent with adopting the theory that the functionality
doctrine's purpose is to avoid undercutting utility patents.
However, the TrafFix Court had little to say about the dangers of trade
dress protection undercutting utility patents.30 2 While the Court discussed
utility patents in connection with the functionality doctrine, utility patents were
relevant to the discussion because they provided strong evidence that the
product feature at issue played a useful role in the product. 33 More
importantly, TrafFix did not confine its definition of functionality to useful
product features. Even if a product feature is found not to be "useful" under the
Inwood standard, courts still must apply the Qualitex standard and inquire
alternatives.
301. Oddi, supra note 220, at 140-4! (footnotes omitted); see also Mohr, supra note 292,
at 389-92 (discussing the differing standards of patent and trademark law).
302. The Court notes that "[t]he Lanham Act does not exist to reward manufacturers for
their innovation in creating a particular device; that is the purpose of the patent law and its
period of exclusivity." TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34 (2001).
303. See id. at 29-30 (finding that a utility patent is "strong evidence" that a patent feature
is functional).
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whether the exclusive use of the feature will "put competitors at a significant
nonreputation-related disadvantage. 304 The Court made clear that this standard
is meant to identify purely ornamental (as opposed to useful) product features
for which there is competitive need and deny them trade dress protection under
the functionality doctrine.305 Indeed, TrafFix gives the aesthetic functionality
doctrine a degree of legitimacy that it never enjoyed in the past. Thus, in total,
TrafFix does not appear to make the "don't undercut utility patents" philosophy
its focus.
C. The General Policy Favoring Free Competition
Another line of authority states that the functionality doctrine serves the
general purpose of "preserving free and effective competition by ensuring that
competitors can copy features that they need to 'compete effectively.0'
30 6
304. See id. at 32 (applying the Qualitex standard).
305. See id. at 34 (discussing Qualitex). The TraJFix Court has nothing specific to say
about the propriety or impropriety of trade dress protection overlapping design patent
protection. There was no occasion to do so, because no design patents were involved in that
case. Some scholars have suggested that a conflict exists between trade dress and design patent
protection and have suggested that the doctrine of aesthetic functionality might be adapted to
avoid or alleviate this conflict. See Perry J. Saidman, Kan TrafFix Kops Katch the Karavan
Kopy Kats? or Beyond Functionality: Design Patents Are the Key to Unlocking the Trade
Dress/Patent Conundrum, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC. 839, 853-57 (2000) (discussing
"aesthetic functionality"); Welkowitz, supra note 79, at 334-43 (same). However, the
"competitive need" standard the TrafFix Court adopted would not eliminate all such overlap,
just as it did not eliminate all overlap between trade dress protection and utility patents.
306. 1 McCARTHY, supra note 207, § 7:63; see also Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit
Corp., 138 F.3d 277, 297-98 (7th Cir. 1998) (explaining the rationale behind the functionality
doctrine); Vomado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1501 (1 0th Cir.
1995) (defining functionality in terms of competitive need); In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc.,
671 F.2d 1332, 1339 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (discussing functionality in terms of effective
competition). Professor McCarthy believes that two rationales underlie the functionality bar:
"(I) accommodation to the important principle of free competition that there is only one legal
source of exclusive rights in utilitarian features-utility patent law, and (2) preserving free and
effective competition by ensuring that competitors can copy features that they need to 'compete
effectively."' I McCARTHY, supra note 207, § 7:63. He notes that while some courts and
authorities place all of the weight on one or the other of these rationales, both policies are
important guides in determining whether a particular product feature or design is functional. Id.
The Federal Circuit has repeatedly stressed that the effect of trade dress protection upon
competition "is really the crux of the matter." See Valu Eng'g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d
1268, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("An important policy underlying the functionality doctrine is the
preservation of competition."); Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356,
1361-62 (Fed Cir. 1999) (attributing the functionality doctrine to the need to preserve
competition); In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1339 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (noting
the importance of preserving competition). The Federal Circuit's emphasis on the practical
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Under this line of reasoning, the functionality doctrine is intended to balance
the social interest in competitors' freedom to copy unpatented products against
the interests in avoiding consumer confusion and protecting business
goodwill.
30 7
This rationale leads to the adoption of a practical effect or competitive
necessity standard of functionality: Distinctive product feature trade dress
should be protected against unauthorized uses that cause a likelihood of
consumer confusion, unless protection will significantly interfere with
competition. However, in TrafFix, the Supreme Court found that a competitive
necessity standard was "incorrect as a comprehensive definition. '"3 8 Rather,
when the design is functional under the Inwood formulation, there is no need to
consider if there is a "competitive necessity for the feature."3' 9 The practical
effect of trade dress protection on competition should only be the test for
product designs and features that are deemed nonfunctional under the Inwood
standard and thus play no material or important role in the product.
As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court appears to have rejected the
notion that the interests in copying unpatented product features and the interests
in avoiding consumer confusion are equally weighted in the case of product
feature trade dress claims.3" ° In TrafFix, the Court essentially ruled that the
interest in competitors' copying will prevail whenever the product feature plays
a material or important role in the product, regardless of the availability of
alternative features that work as well, or other evidence that competitors may
not need to copy the feature in order to compete effectively.3" The weighing or
effect on competition has been highly influential in other Circuits.
307. The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, which embraced the general
"preserving free and effective competition" rationale, explains: "The rule excluding functional
designs from the subject matter of trademark law is an attempt to identify situations in which the
public and private interest in avoiding confusion is outweighed by the anticompetitive
consequences of trademark protection." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17
cmt. a (1995); see also Fabrication Enters., Inc. v. Hygienic Corp., 64 F.3d 53, 58-59 (2d Cir.
1995) (noting the need to balance competition and avoid confusion); Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d
at 1337 (noting the balance of interests); Dratler, supra note 2, at 940 ("Many courts have
opined that the doctrine is intended to balance society's interest in free competition (reflected in
producers' rights to copy designs not protected by patent or copyright) against the interests of
consumers in freedom from confusion and the interests of producers in identifying their
products and retaining the associated good will.").
308. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32-33 (2001).
309. Id. at 33.
310. See Vomado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498,1504 (10th
Cir. 1995) ("When asked to balance the concerns of patent law against those of unfair
competition law with respect to the copying of product shapes, the Supreme Court has ruled
repeatedly over the years that the right to copy must prevail.").
3 1I. See TrajFix, 532 U.S. at 33-34 (stating that alternative design possibilities are
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balancing of interests, while not completely rejected, is reserved for those cases
involving product features that are merely ornamental, arbitrary or incidental.
D. The Public Bargain Doctrine
The public bargain doctrine is also sometimes cited in connection with the
functionality doctrine."' Commentators generally attribute this doctrine to the
Supreme Court's decisions in Singer and Kellogg.3" 3 It holds that in return for
granting a patent, the public receives the right to copy the patented invention
upon the expiration of the patent term.314 The Constitution's Patents and
Copyrights Clause3 5 may mandate this quid pro quo arrangement in itself
because dedication of patented inventions to the public domain is an important
way that the patent law "promote[s] the progress of Science and useful Arts. 31 6
irrelevant once functionality is determined).
312. See infra notes 320-21 (relating functionality to public bargain).
313. Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938); Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg.
Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896).
314. See Singer, 163 U.S. at 185 (discussing the tradeoff involved in granting a patent).
The Court explained:
It is self-evident that on the expiration of a patent the monopoly created by it ceases
to exist, and the right to make the thing formerly covered by the patent becomes
public property. It is upon this condition that the patent is granted. It follows, as a
matter of course, that on the termination of the patent there passes to the public the
right to make the machine in the form in which it was constructed during the patent.
Id. at 135; see also supra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing the public bargain
doctrine).
315. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
316. Id.; see also Mohr, supra note 292, at 348 (footnotes omitted) (discussing the
Constitutional bargain). Mohr explained:
The Patent Clause and statutes passed pursuant to it were intended to create a
bargain between society and the inventor, a straightforward quid pro quo
arrangement in which the government would grant to inventors a limited-duration
monopoly allowing them to exploit their inventions without fear of competition. In
return, the inventor was obliged to disclose to the public precisely how the
invention worked, so that others could improve upon it and make further advances
in the relevant technology. Thus, the inventor's disclosure was to be the
consideration that would support the government's grant of patent rights; only if
properly disclosed would the invention be available for use, thus allowing society
to benefit from its bargain. Further, once the patent term expired, the invention
would enter the public domain and become available for the public to use and copy
freely.
Mohr, supra note 292, at 348.
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Perhaps the strongest statement of the public bargain doctrine, for present
purposes, can be found in the Supreme Court's decision in Scott Paper Co. v.
Marcalus Manufacturing Co. :317
By the force of the patent laws not only is the invention of a patent
dedicated to the public upon its expiration, but the public thereby becomes
entitled to share in the good will which the patentee has built up in the
patented article or product through the enjoyment of his patent monopoly.
Hence we have held that the patentee may not exclude the public from
participating in that good will or secure, to any extent, a continuation of his
monopoly by resorting to the trademark law and registering as a trademark
any particular descriptive matter appearing in the specifications, drawings
or claims of the expired patent, whether or not such matter describes
essential elements of the invention or claims.31 s
In Bonito Boats, the Supreme Court revisited and reaffirmed the basic principle
that "after the expiration of a federal patent, the subject matter of the patent
passes to the free use of the public as a matter of federal law.
' 319
Some authorities have attributed the rationale underlying the functionality
doctrine directly to the public bargain doctrine.320 Others have described the
functionality doctrine as accommodating or reconciling trade dress protection to
the public bargain doctrine.32' Still others have distinguished this line of cases,
317. Scott Paper Co. v. Morcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249,256 (1945). In Scott Paper, the
defendant was charged with infringing a patent that it had assigned to the plaintiff. Id. The
issue was whether the assignor was estopped (by virtue of his assignment) from arguing that an
expired patent covered his allegedly infringing device. Id. at 250. The Court found that the
assignor was not estopped, reasoning that application of the doctrine of estoppel under these
circumstances would be inconsistent with the rule that the subject matter of expired patents is
dedicated to the public. See id. at 259-60 (considering the doctrine of estoppel and patent law).
Once the subject of an expired patent has entered the public domain, the rights in it cannot be
subject to private barter, sale, or waiver. See id. at 256 (discussing the public bargain doctrine).
318. Id. (citing Kellogg and Singer).
319. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152 (1989) (citing
Kellogg and Singer). The Bonito Boats Court added: "For almost 100 years it has been well
established that in the case of an expired patent, the federal patent laws do create a federal right
to 'copy and to use." Id. at 165; see also Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,
123 S.Ct. 2041, 2048 (2003) ("The rights of a patentee or copyright holder are part of a
'carefully crafted bargain,' ... under which, once the patent or copyright monopoly has expired,
the public may use the invention or work at will and without attribution." (quoting Bonito
Boats, 489 U.S. at 150-5 1)).
320. See, e.g., Merchant & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods. Co., Inc., 963 F.2d 628,
633-34 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting functionality's genesis from the public bargain doctrine); Eco
Mfg., LLC v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 2d 854, 865 (S.D. Ind. 2003) (discussing
relationship between trademark and patent law).
321. See, e.g., Midwest Indus. v. Karavan Trailers, 175 F.3d 1356, 1362-64 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (reconciling trade dress protection and the public bargain doctrine); Kohler Co. v. Moen,
Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 644-48 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (discussing the
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finding it not directly applicable to Lanham Act trade dress protection for
product features.3 22 Once again, the TrafFix Court did little to clarify matters.
At the end of its opinion, the TrafFix Court noted arguments by the
defendant and some of its amici that the Patents Clause "of its own force,
prohibits the holder of an expired utility patent from claiming trade dress
protection," but the TrafFix Court declined to take up the question.323 The
Court noted that "[i]f, despite the rule that functional features may not be the
subject of trade dress protection, a case arises in which trade dress becomes the
practical equivalent of an expired utility patent, that will be time enough to
Sears/Compco/Bonito Boats line of cases); In re Honeywell, 497 F.2d 1344, 1347-48 (C.C.P.A.
1974) (discussing the role of functionality); I MCCARTHY, supra note 207, § 6:11 (explaining
the role of functionality in design patent law); Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Directing TrajFix: A
Comment on the Construction and Application of Utility Patent Claims in TradeDress
Litigation, 54 FLA. L. REv. 229, 249-51 (2002) (discussing functionality in trade dress
protection law).
Under this theory, the doctrine of functionality reconciles conflicts between trade dress
protection and the rule that inventions covered by utility patents enter the public domain upon
expiration. To the extent that trade dress protection and design patents conflict, the doctrine of
functionality may not reconcile the differences. Some courts have held that the public bargain
rationale set forth in Singer, Kellogg and Scott Paper is not applicable to expired design patents.
See In re Honeywell, 497 F.2d 1244, 1348-49 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (distinguishing design patents).
In Honeywell, the court noted that:
In those cases the Supreme Court was concerned not with nonfunctional features of
expired design patents, but rather functional features of utility patents and whether
or not the public domain acquired the subject matter of those utility patents upon
their expiration. However, the solicitor submits that the principle of Kellogg is also
applicable to design patents insofar as the Kellogg Company, in addition to its
utility patents, at one time had a design patent on the pillow-shape of its shredded
wheat biscuit.
•.. That analysis was not predicated upon the mere fact that the pillow-shape was
claimed in a design patent, but rather that the pillow-shape was a functional feature
which was the necessary result of following the teachings of the utility patent.
Id. But see Vomado Air Circulation Sys. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1506-07 (10th Cir.
1995) (finding the functionality doctrine inadequate to reconcile trade dress and the Patent Act);
Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 648 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cudahy, J. dissenting) ("There is
no basis for treating the subject matter of design and utility patents differently.").
322. See, e.g., Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Parduit Corp., 138 F.3d 277, 285-87 (7th Cir.
1998) (distinguishing Singer and Kellogg on their facts and Scott Paper as "merely dicta");
Cotter, supra note 297, at 44-45 (noting that neither the Singer nor the Kellogg Court
confronted an apparent conflict between federal patent policy and another federal statute and
that both the Singer and Kellogg Court "seemed to view the assertion of trademark rights in the
name and shape of the article as an illegitimate attempt to extend the owner's patent" and they
also "stressed the plaintiff's own use of the name as a generic term and, at least in Kellogg, the
defendant's need to copy the shape of the product in order to compete").
323. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32-33 (2001)
(declining to resolve issues involving the Patent Clause).
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consider the matter. 324 The Court had just significantly raised the functionality
standard, making it much less likely, as a practical matter, that trade dress
protection would extend to the subject matter of expired utility patents. Thus,
the Court may have been suggesting that a higher functionality standard is a
means to avoid a conflict between trade dress protection and the public bargain
doctrine. This suggestion would support the view that the functionality
doctrine "mediates conflicts between patent law and trade dress law"3 12 and
reconciles trade dress protection with the Singer/Kellogg/Scott Paper line of
cases.
326
The TrafFix Court also seemed to stress the "vital significance" of an
expired patent to a claim of trade dress infringement, emphasizing the "great
weight" that evidence of the expired utility patent would add to the statutory
presumption of functionality. 327 This, too, might suggest that the Court was
addressing the policy set forth in Singer, Kellogg, and Scott Paper. However,
the Court made no reference to that line of cases. Rather, the Court stated a
different rationale for emphasizing disclosure of a feature in utility patent
claims in the functionality inquiry:328  This evidence demonstrates the
324. Id.
325. See I MCCARTHY, supra note 207, § 6:10 (interpreting TrafFix).
326. The Trafrix Court had no occasion to directly address the question of conflict
between trade dress protection and expired design patents, but the Court's adoption of the
secondary Qualitex competitive necessity functionality standard, to be applied in the case of
ornamental product features, may suggest that it sees some potential for conflict. See TrafFix,
532 U.S. at 32-33 (discussing the Qualitex standard).
327. See id. (discussing the relevance of a utility patent). The Court stated:
A prior patent, we conclude, has vital significance in resolving the trade dress
claim. A utility patent is strong evidence that the features therein claimed are
functional. If trade dress protection is sought for those features the strong evidence
of functionality based on the previous patent adds great weight to the statutory
presumption that features are deemed functional until proved otherwise by the party
seeking trade dress protection. Where the expired patent claimed the features in
question, one who seeks to establish trade dress protection must carry the heavy
burden of showing that the feature is not functional, for instance by showing that it
is merely an ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary aspect of the device.
Id.
328. See id. (discussing the emphasis on disclosure of the feature in functional inquiry).
The Court stated:
The rationale for the rule that the disclosure of a feature in the claims of a utility
patent constitutes strong evidence of functionality is well illustrated in this case.
The dual-spring design serves the important purpose of keeping the sign upright
even in heavy wind conditions; and, as confirmed by the statements in the expired
patents, it does so in a unique and useful manner .... The dual-spring design
affects the cost of the device as well; it was acknowledged that the device "could
use three springs but this would unnecessarily increase the cost of the device."
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relationship of the feature to the use or purpose of the invention. Moreover,
later in the opinion, the Court made it clear that all product features would be
subject to the same nonfunctionality standard as a prerequisite to trade dress
protection, regardless of whether a utility patent had previously protected
them.329
E. Conclusion to Part V
TrafFix did not fully align the Supreme Court with any of the policies that
have been cited as justifying the functionality doctrine. However, the TrajFix
Court can be characterized as taking the next step in defining the scope of the
policy set forth in the Sears/Compco/Bonito Boats line of cases, by extending it
to federal trade dress protection. TralFix may be characterized as extending the
public domain rationale of Sears/Compco to federal trade dress protection in a
general way, but with the proviso that a lower bar will exist with regard to trade
dress protection for purely ornamental product features.
VI. Conclusion
The Supreme Court has clearly undertaken, in Wal-Mart and now in
TrafFix, to curb use of the Lanham Act to prevent product knock-offs.
Properly construed, the Court's primary (Inwood) standard for functionality
looks strictly to the role that a product feature plays in a product. It determines
whether the feature plays a material or important role in the use or purpose of
the product, or whether it affects the cost or quality of the product. Essentially,
only those product features that are merely incidental or arbitrary are likely to
be subject to trade dress protection under this standard. If product features are
nonfunctional under this standard, then courts must impose a second
functionality standard, which entails measuring competitive need for the
features. Under this second, Qualitex standard, courts must look to the
availability of satisfactory alternative product features to determine whether
trade dress protection will significantly interfere with competition under the
Id. at 31-32.
329. See id. (requiring nonfunctionality). The Court found that:
Whether a utility patent has expired or there has been no utility patent at all, a
product design which has a particular appearance may be functional because it is
"essential to the use or purpose of the article" or "affects the cost or quality of the
article."
Id. at 35 (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982)).
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facts of the particular case. Thus, even purely aesthetic product features may be
disqualified as "functional," if competitors are unable to compete effectively
without access to them.
While there have been several different theoretical underpinnings
attributed to the functionality doctrine, the TrafFix formulation does not fully
conform to any of them. However, the formulation appears generally consistent
with the doctrine set forth in the Sears/CompcolBonito Boats line of cases,
though it deviates from that line of cases by setting a lower bar for protectibility
in the case of purely ornamental features. This result, along with the Court's
reliance on Sears and Bonito Boats as precedent for its functionality standard,
suggests that the Court is taking the next step in defining the scope of the
Sears/Compco/Bonito Boats doctrine by extending its reasoning to federal trade
dress protection.
